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Liberty means responsibility.
That is why most men dreadit.
G. Bernard Shaw.
I.

PROFESSIONS AND COMPETITION: TRADITION AND MODERNITYREGULATORY TRADITION VERSUS LIBERALIZING TREND

Professional practice has traditionally distinguished itself for being
subject to strong regulation, characterized by containing severe restrictions
on competition between professionals. These restrictions, among which it
is necessary to emphasize limitations on fee fixation, advertising or on
associated practice, have been justified arguing that professional activity
peculiarities and, especially, their impact on essential values of general
interest make it necessary to restrict competition in order to guarantee the
quality of professional services, with the ultimate aim of protecting
consumers' interest and, in general, guarding the public interest.
In this respect, a deep and clear separation has been established
between the regulatory regime of professionals and that of business
enterprises; by having subjected the first ones to a special statute clearly
different from the one applicable to the latter ones, excluding in a radical
form the subordination of professional practice to Competition Law.
Nevertheless, in actuality, and product of a long process, the trend
goes clearly in the direction of holding professional activity entirely to the
rules of free competition. This trend has been encouraged by the idea that
the improvement of the quality of professional services is not obtained by
restricting competition, but by promoting it, since competition has precisely
among its principles objectives increasing the efficiency of markets
improving the quality of services interchanged in the same, all in the benefit
of consumers and of society in general. Nonetheless, it must be said that
the above-mentioned trend does not try to eliminate in absolute form all of
the restrictions, but only those that do not effectively serve the objective of
guaranteeing the quality of professional services.
In any case, the full application of Competition Law in professional
practice constitutes, undoubtedly, one of the most eloquent manifestations
of the convergence that is taking place between the regime of professionals
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and business enterprises. To the effects of the application of the said branch
of the legal system, this convergence has been taken to its final
consequences by having taken refuge in a wide concept of enterprise that
clearly also includes professionals.
The application of competition rules to professional activity still finds
an even greater justification, if such fits, in view of the deep transformations this activity has experimented in recent times, and that have been
translated into a strong expansion of this sector and in its increasing
influence on the economy.
This way, traditionally, professional practice has characterized itself by
constituting an intellectual activity developed in an individual, personal and
independent form in a territorial sphere of essentially local character and
directed overall at individual consumers. In actuality, this traditional
paradigm is in crisis, largely provoked by the impact of powerful trends
such as, among others, the mass-production and specialization of the
professions, the internationalization of the economy and the development of
new technologies. These trends have forced professionals to modify the
traditional forms of practice and to assume new challenges that allow them
to react to the changes.
Thus, professional practice, without ceasing to be an intellectual
activity, today tends to be carried out by using typically business organizational methods, in such a way that each time providing professional services
collectively is more frequent, often in a multidisciplinary environment in
which members of diverse professions partake, in a territorial area of
national and, also, international character and essentially directed at, more
than at individual consumers. All of the above allows affirming that the
professional sector has changed more in this latter decade than in the last
one hundred years.
II.
A.

TRANSFORMATIONS IN PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE

Concept of Profession
1.

TraditionalParadigmof Profession

The analysis of professional activity's subjection to Competition Law
demands, as a first step, delimiting the concept of profession.' In this
1.

Regarding this delimitation, in our administrative doctrine, see Fernando Sainz Moreno,

Articulo 36. Colegios Profesionales[Article 36. ProfessionalAssociations], in 3 COMENTARIOS A LAS
LEYES POLiTICAS: CONSTITUCI6N ESPAR4OLA DE 1978 [COMMENTARIES TO POLITICAL LAWS: SPANISH
CONSTITUTION OF 1978] 507, 511-32 (Editoriales de Derecho Reunidas [Reunited Laws Editorials]
1983); GASPAR ARINO ORTIZ & JOSt MARiA SouvtR6N MORENILLA, CONSTITUCION Y COLEGIOS
PROFESIONALES:

UNA REFLEXI6N SOBRE LAS CORPORACIONES REPRESENTATIVAS [CONSTITUTION
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regard, it is necessary to begin by stating that this delimitation is not, by any
means, an easy task, neither from the sociological point of view, nor from
the legal point of view. In this respect, it has rightly been affirmed that the
concept of profession is a dynamic concept, not a static one.2
From the legal perspective, it must be noted that our legal system does
not contain a specific or general concept of profession. In fact, the
existence of different branches in our legal system, each with a particular
purpose, that regulate professional activity (administrative, civil, commercial, tax, labor law, etc.), result in the term profession being used in our
legal system for designating multiple distinct concepts, depending on the
purpose of a specific rule.
AND PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATIONS: A REFLECTION ON THE REPRESENTATIVE CORPORATIONS] 97-111
(Uni6n ed. 1984); JOsE MARIA SouviR6N MORENILLA, LA CONFIGURACI6N JURiDICA DE LAS
PROFESIONES TITULADAS EN ESPAfqA Y EN LA COMUNIDAD ECON6MICA EUROPEA (CEE) [THE LEGAL
CONFIGURATION OF PROFESSIONAL DEGREES EARNED IN SPAIN AND THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC
COMMUNITY (EEC)] 23-78 (Consejo de Universidades [Universities' Council] 1988); Antonio Fanlo
Flores, Encuadre Histdrico y Constitucional. Naturalezay Fines. La Autonomia Colegial [Historical
and Constitutional Frame. Nature and Purposes. Professional Associations' Autonomy], in LOS
COLEGIOS PROFESIONALES A LA LUZ DE LA CONSTITUCI6N [PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATIONS IN LIGHT OF
THE CONSTITUTION] 67, 104-16 (Lorenzo Martin-Retortillo coordinator, Civitas 1996).
By its own accord, in our private law doctrine, see MARIANO YZQUIERDO TOLSADA, LA
RESPONSABILIDAD CIVIL DEL PROFESIONAL LIBERAL [THE CIVIL RESPONSIBILITY OF THE LIBERAL
PROFESSIONAL]

(Hammurabi

S.R.L.

1989);

ANTONIO FRANCISCO

DELGADO

GONZALEZ,

LAS

SOCIEDADES PROFESIONALES: EL EJERCICIO COMIN DE LAS PROFESIONES EN ESPA.IA: SUS ASPECTOS
ADMINISTRATIVOS, CIVILES Y TRIBUTARIOS [PROFESSIONAL CORPORATIONS: COLLECTIVE PRACTICE
OF THE PROFESSIONS IN SPAIN: THEIR ADMINISTRATIVE, CIVIL AND TRIBUTARY ASPECTS] 1-27
(Editoriales de Derecho Reunidas [Reunited Editorials of Law] 1996); AURORA CAMPINS VARGAS, LA
SOCIEDAD PROFESIONAL [THE PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION]

1 & 63-83 (Civitas 2000); MARIA

DOLORES CERVILLA GARZ6N, LA PRESTACI6N DE SERVICIOS PROFESIONALES [THE RENDERING OF
PROFESSIONAL SERVICES] 23-52 (Tirant lo Blanch 2001).
From a sociological perspective, see Maria Teresa Alonso Prez, Notas Para un Estudio
Sociol6gico y Econ6mico de las Profesiones Liberales [Notes for a Sociologicaland Economic Study of
the Liberal Professions], in EL EJERCICIO EN GRUPO DE PROFESIONES LIBERALES [THE PRACTICE IN
GROUPS OF LIBERAL PROFESSIONALS] 15-82 (Bemardo Moreno Quesada et al. eds., 1993); Angel J.
Gallego
Morales,
Profesionalizaci6n, Desprofesionalizaci6n y
F6rmulas Organizativas
[Professionalization,Deprofessionalization,and OrganizationalFormulas], in EL EJERCICIO EN GRUPO
DE PROFESIONES LIBERALES [THE PRACTICE IN GROUPS OF LIBERAL PROFESSIONALS]

83-122

(Bemardo Moreno Quesada et al. eds., 1993).
In comparative literature, see JOCHEN TAUPITZ, DIE STANDESORDNUNGEN DER FREIEN BERUFE:
GESCHICHTLICHE ENTWICKLUNG, FUNKTIONEN, STELLUNG IM RECHTSSYSTEM [THE CONDITION OF THE
ORDER OF LIBERAL OCUPATIONS:

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT, FUNCTIONS, AND POSITION IN THE

LEGAL SYSTEM] 11-151 (Walter De Gruyter Inc. 1991).
2.

Cf Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, Concurrence et Professions Liberales:

Antagonisme ou

Compatibilite? [Competition and Liberal Professions: Antagonism or Compatibility?], REVUE DU
MARCHE COMMUN ET DE L'UNION EUROPEENNE [R.M.C.U.E.] [REV. OF THE COMMON MARKET & THE
EU], No. 365, at 136, 138 (1993).
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From the sociological perspective, there is also no existence of a
unanimously accepted, specific or general concept that accurately establishes the common features of this social reality. In this regard, the Royal
Academy Dictionary defines the term "profession" as "[e]mployment,
faculty, or trade someone practices and for which he perceives a remuneration."3 In this extraordinarily broad definition, profession would be synonymous with occupation in general. Notwithstanding, to the effects of the
present study, this wide definition does not aid in delimiting the concept of
profession, making it necessary to use a more restricted definition. In this
sequence, it is fitting to affirm that traditionally the term profession has
been identified with all activities that possess the following characteristics:
1)

2)

3)

3.
DICTIONARY]

Intellectualactivity, consistent in the application of a higher
level of knowledge to reality. This characteristic allows for
profession and occupation to be distinguished, a distinction
that is otherwise found gathered in article 35 of the Constitution, establishing as a fundamental right "the freedom
to choose a profession or occupation." Thus, while professsion is essentially an intellectual activity, occupation is
primarily a manual activity. In this regard, it must be
indicated that the intellectual component traditionally has
granted considerable prestige and social recognition to
professionals.
Independent activity, in a double sense. On one hand, the
professional or internal independence, consistent with criterion discretion or freedom the professional possesses in
the development of his activity, and concretely, in the application of his knowledge in conformity with his lex artis
(law of skill technique), as well as in the selection of the
means he considers most adequate in order to obtain the
sought after result. On the other hand, the economic or
external independence, in the sense of performance of his
own account in freedom regime or organizational autonomy, lacking of any dependence or subordination link
before another entity.
Individual activity, in consideration of how the client
essentially selects the professional for his intuitu personae
(personal characteristics), which implies a personal and
individual execution of the requested services, the birth of a
fiduciary relationship based on confidence, and the
generation of personal responsibility.

DICCIONARIO

DE

LA

REAL

ACADEMIA

ESPA/ROLA

[SPANISH

(22d ed. 2001), available at http://buscon.rae.es/diccionario/drae.htm.

ROYAL

ACADEMY
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5)

6)

7)
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Altruistic activity, directed at satisfying the general interest,
more than the individual interest, motive by which the
remuneration traditionally has not been an essential element
of professions, without prejudice that evidently could exist
in reality. An eloquent manifestation of this characteristic
constitutes the fact that, while remuneration of services is
termed "price" in mercantile traffic, a term that expresses
the idea of materiality and concretion; in the professional
area the term for this concept has been coined as "fees"
which possesses a spiritual and intangible component.
Regulated activity and, in numerous suppositions, autoregulated by the actual professionals, structured often around
a professional organization that organizes the exercise of its
activity, establishing an exclusive area of performance and a
deontological code directed at safeguarding the profession's
values.
Local activity, the fact that providing professional services
constitutes an individual and personal activity, causes it to
generally be executed only in a territorial area limited by
local borders.
Generalist and unidisciplinary activity, in the sense that
professionals render, in general, all the services that are
linked to a specific profession and do so in an isolated way
with respect to the services rendered by other professions.
2.

Crisis of the TraditionalParadigm

In recent times, and as it has been advanced, the traditional paradigm
of profession described above has entered a crisis because of the profound
transformations experienced by our current society. This crisis of the
professions should not be mistaken by any means as a weakening or a
decline of professional activity, since in this respect the opposite is
occurring: the number of professionals and the diversity of professions
does not stop increasing and the rendering of professional services is
presently in full summit, experiencing high growth spurts superior to those
of other economic sectors. The crisis rather refers to the erosion process
that the traits traditionally defining the classic paradigm of profession are
suffering and force a revision of this paradigm. This erosion process is
characterized by the following elements.
1)

Regarding intellectual activity, although undoubtedly it
continues being one of the defining principal features of the
profession, its virtuosity has been qualified, since the
universalized access to a university education, the increase
of the university degrees, and the increasing specialization
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2)

3)

4)

of work have resulted in a mass-production of professions,
blurring the previously clear separation between professsional activity and other activities, particularly the distinction between professions and occupations. On the other
hand, the mentioned phenomena have reduced the enormous prestige and social recognition that has traditionally
characterized the professions.
In reference to the independent activity feature, although
professional or internal independence is retained in a discretionary sense in the application of lex artis, the economic
or external independence has remained blurry enough due
to the trend towards the so-called proletarization of the
professionals. By virtue of this trend, as opposed to the
classic liberal professionals, who practice by their own
accord and of independent form, every day more wageearning professionals are designated, who act by foreign
account under labor or civil servant regime. Therefore,
professionals of a sole client (such as the in-house lawyer)
and professionals without clients (such as the pro bono
attorney or one of an insurance company that offers legal
defense insurance) are proliferated.
In relation to individual activity, it must be indicated that
multiple phenomena, among which social reality sophistication, professional specialization and economic globalization stand out, have generated the need for professionals to
associate with other professionals belonging to the same or
different profession to obtain a more efficient rendering of
services. This trend towards corporatizationof professions
is leaving the traditionally individual character of professsional activity on another level. In this context, the professsional's personal responsibility is tinged by the presence of
a professional corporation, similar as to what happens in
professionals under labor or civil servant regimes. Parallel
to this, advancement in technologies has increased the
quantity and speed of information at users' disposal and
permits them to do without the physical barriers that
corporeal providing of services demands, which facilitates
providing services by professionals via new technologies by
means of a virtual activity, including providing professional
services within the general category of electronic trade.
With respect to altruistic activity, professional practice
suffers a bequeathing process that is manifested in two
ideas. On one hand, the confirmation that professional
services are susceptible to economic valuation, in spite of
relapsing on abstract or spiritual values, such as life, liberty,
or justice. And, on the other hand, the fact that profess-
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sionals develop their activity in onerous form and with
encouragement for profit and, therefore, with a private
interest, without this being incompatible with recognizing
that said activity possesses an enormous public transcendences and, as a consequence, is of general interest. This
evolution reverts into a process of professional mercantilization or commercialization, which is also reflected in professionals' resort to human and material resource organizational techniques increasingly similar to those business
enterprises use to develop their economic activity.
In reference to regulated activity, the trend towards deregulation is spreading its effects on professional organizations as well, limiting and modulating their traditional competencies in professional practice regulation matters.
As for local activity, improvements in communications and
telecommunications, as well as economic globalization,
result in professionals breaking the traditional local barriers
and developing increasingly national or international
activity, which in turn has favored the search for alliances
and strategies at national, regional, or even international
levels.
In reference to the generalist and unidisciplinaryactivity,
the trend is directed rather towards a specialized and multidisciplinary activity, since our civilization's increasing
social, economic and legal complexity causes citizens to
have increasingly sophisticated problems, at the same time
that they are more informed and protected by consumer law,
which makes them each time more demanding. This
complex demand of professional services forces professsionals to specialize and collaborate with other professsionals in multidisciplinary structures.

These transformations do not imply the professional's absolute disfiguration.
The professions essentially continue being an intellectual
activity and subjected to regulation. What occurs is these characteristics are
tinged. The new circumstances are translated in the appearance of a heterogeneous reality of professionals before the traditional homogeneity. The
individual, independent, generalist and unidisciplinary professional model
does not have to disappear. What happens is that different models arise.
Concretely, a professional model that works in a collective, specialized and
multidisciplinary environment. Law must respond to new challenges this
new social reality poses, facilitating the necessary legal structures to
practice professions in a form in accordance with the current situation. In
good part, putting forth these structures demands, as will be shown later on,
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the elimination of some of the competition restrictions currently imposed on
professional activity.
B.

ProfessionalRegulation
1.

Competition Regulation and Restrictions

In repetition, one of the principal characteristics of the regulation of
professions is the establishment of severe restrictions to free competition
among professionals. In most cases, Professional Associations impose
these restrictions, exercising their power to regulate the professions, though
some of them are established directly by the legislator. In other cases, in
turn, they are not gathered in a legislative or professional norm, but rather
they originate in the practice or conduct of a professional organization, a
professionals' group or, even, from an individual professional.
In any case, it is interesting to emphasize there exists an enormous
variety of possible restrictions to competition, which can be grouped into
two big categories, depending on which of the following two free enterprise
principle manifestations are affected: access or entry freedom, by virtue of
which every person has the right to freely fulfill an economic activity; and
practice freedom, according to which any person has the right to develop
said economic activity in the conditions he or she considers appropriate.
1)

2)

Professionalactivity access restrictions,by means of which
access or entry freedom is limited to the furnishing of
certain professional services, demanding fulfillment of
predetermined requirements, motive for which economic
literature calls them "entry barriers."
Professional activity practice restrictions, by virtue of
which practice freedom is limited establishing specific conditions for furnishing predetermined professional services,
essentially gathered in deontological codes of conduct,
whose supervision and control is attributed to Professional
Associations via the exercise of disciplinary powers.

Among the restrictions relative to professional activity access, it is
worth mentioning the following:
1)

2)

Demand for degrees, by way that certain professional
activities can only be realized by those who confirm to
possess the necessary knowledge for it, through the
obtainment of the corresponding academic degree;
Obligatoryprofessionaladmittance as a necessary requisite
to be able to practice a certain professional activity;
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Entrance tests implementation that credit the possession of
certain professional knowledge, as prior requisite to be able
to become a member of an association, being at the same
time a prior requisite to be able to practice a professional
activity;
Practiceperiods implementation that credit the possession
of a certain level of professional experience, also as prior
requisite to be able to become a member of an association,
being at the same time a prior requisite to be able to practice
a professional activity;
The establishment of numerus clausus (limits), through
which is limited the number of candidates who can accede
to the profession;
The fulfillment of specific requirements for becoming a
member of an association, such as paying membership fees,
obtaining civil liability insurance or joining a social
prevision mutuality;
The fulfillment of specific requirements after becoming a
member of an association, such as the imposition of test
completions as a mechanism of continued education
directed at guaranteeing the continued necessary knowledge
to develop a specific professional activity;
The establishment of the designated activity reserve, which
consists in exclusive assignment to the members of a
specific profession the furnishing of a few predetermined
professional services, preventing therefore any other
profession from providing those services;
Prohibition of creating Professional Associations, preventing thus the existence of diverse Associations with
powers in the same territorial area.

3)

4)

5)

6)

7)

8)

9)

As for the restrictions relative to professional activity practice, the
following must be outlined:
1)

The limitation of uninhibitedfee fixation, which certainly
constitutes one of the most serious restrictions, given the4
importance that price possesses in a market economy,
being able to adopt this restriction in multiple forms, direct
or indirect, among which fits to mention the following ones:

4.

Regarding the importance of price as one of the basic elements for the formulation of offer

and demand, see FELIPE PALAU RAMiREZ, DESCUENTOS PROMOCIONALES: UN ANALISIS DESDE EL
DERECHO CONTRA LA COMPETENCIA DESLEAL Y LA NORMATIVA DE ORDENACION DEL COMERCIO
[PROMOTIONAL DISCOUNTS:

AN ANALYSES FROM THE UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW AND THE RULES OF

COMMERCE REGULATION] 89-104 (Marcial Pons ed., Idelco 1998).
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2)

3)

4)

a) The collective fee fixation, be they fixed, maximums,
minimums or, inclusive, orientative;
b) The exigency of professional projects' visas, whose
discharge is conditioned to the fulfillment of association fee rules (typical restriction of technical professsions such as architects, riggers and engineers);
c) The obligatoryfee collection through the Professional
Association (also a typical restriction of the abovementioned technical professions);
d) The exigency of permissions or authorizations to
substitute a professional, conditioned to the prior
satisfaction of fees earned by the professional who had
previously assumed the professional contract (typical
restriction of the legal profession, but also existent in
some technical professions);
e) The The prohibition offixing fees depending on the
result, as occurs for example in the legal profession
with the so-called contingency fee (fee payment to the
professional is done after the proceedings' success),
by virtue of which fees are fixed as a percentage of the
value of the object of the professional contract;
f) The imposition of economic considerations by the
Professional Associations, different from membership
fees, for providing services or fulfilling certain acts,
such as the obligatory fee collection in the architect's
case or the official acceptance of the authority credentials of an attorney in the attorney's case;
g) The prohibition of the payment of economic considerations to third parties for referring clients to a
professional;
Advertising restrictions, either directly prohibiting the use
of advertising media, or restricting this possibility, submitting it to essence or form requirements, such as prior
authorization or content limitations, or the dispersion or size
of the advertising media;
Associated practice restrictions,limiting the organizational
structures available to practice the profession collectively,
either directly prohibiting this possibility, or restricting it by
limiting the number of associated professionals, the association entities, the requisites to be a partner or a director
therein, the multidisciplinary grouping of members of
different professions or the participation of non professsionals as partners or directors of the association entity;
The imposition of territorialrestrictions,consistent in limiting the circulation freedom of services, restricting the
activity of an associated member in a territory different to
the one of membership demanding, the (double) association
membership in the place of performance, the payment of
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economic considerations, and/or the completion of administrative procedures in authoritative or communicative form.
It is necessary to warn that the restrictions to access and practice have
been the object of a different valuation on behalf of authorities in control of
the competition. This way, said authorities generally value access restrictions in a more permissive way, tending to admit them, in consideration that
in principle they are justified by possessing a direct relation with the need to
guarantee the quality of professional services. The typical example is the
degree requirement, whose basic function is, precisely, to credit the
existence of the knowledge that permits the guarantee of the quality of such
services. On the other hand, the competition authorities have generally
shown a more belligerent attitude towards the restrictions on professional
practice, by making it more difficult to justify their existence for the sake of
guaranteeing the quality of the professional activity, especially in relation
with all the above-mentioned restrictions, directly or indirectly, to the
uninhibited fee fixation.
2.

Trend Towards Deregulation

Such as has also been pointed out, professional activity has been
experiencing in recent times a deregulation or liberalization process. This
process is situated in the context of a general trend towards the deregulation
of economic activity. This trend originated in the United States during the
sixties' decade, when the first critical reviews on excess public intervention
in the economy began to arise. In this context, the University of Chicago
economists began analyzing this phenomenon under the theory of prices
prism, to refute the traditional doctrine that assumed public intervention in
the economy was justified by the need to protect the general interest.' Yet,
to the contrary, the conclusion they came to is that public intervention often
constituted an instrument to transfer wealth to regulated undertakings via
organized pressure groups, in exchange for economic contributions to
politicians who conducted the denominated "capture" of the regulator by
the regulated undertakings. The need to find a solution to the seventies'
crisis finally imposed the adoption of a liberalizing policy based on
deregulation.
5.

Regarding the deregulation phenomenon, see the classical work of George J. Stigler, The

Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. OF ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3 (1971).
Between us, see Jose EUGENIO SORIANO GARCiA, DESREGULACI6N, PRIVATIZACION Y DERECHO

1-61 (Publicaciones
del Real Colegio de Espafia [Spain Royal C. Publ'n] 1993); Amadeo Petitb6 Juan, Desregularpara
ADMINISTRATIVO [DEREGULATION, PRIVATIZATION, AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW]

Competiry Ganar Eficiencia [Deregulate to Compete and Gain Efficiency], GACETA JURIDICA DE LA

COMPETENCIA Y DE LA UE [GJ] [JURID. J. OF COMPETITION & THE EU], 1999, No. 200, at 31-4 1.
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In this regard, it is suitable to distinguish between deregulation and
liberalization. In this regard, it has been affirmed that
liberalization policy should not be confused with deregulation,
understood in a wide sense, that is, as policy tending to the
elimination of rules that organize a sector or the disappearance of
the State's intervention in the economy. Liberalization means, on
the contrary, limiting or reducing the State's normative intervention to what should be its true function: on one hand, the guardianship of the public interest, for example, the safety, health, or
well-being of the citizens; in this regard rules of administrative
policy, security, inspection and technical control, environmental
protection, etc., and no one proposes their derogation. And, on
the other hand, competition control, a task to which are obligated
all Public Administrations and
6 which must not be left in hands of
affected economic operators.
For this reason, liberalization, unlike what is understood in stricto sensu
(strict sense) for deregulation, does not imply the absolute suppression of
regulation, but rather a neo-regulation or re-regulation of the
economic
7
same.

The concrete terms in which this trend towards regulation has
projected itself on the professional sector constitute the central subject of
chapters three and four of the present study, referring to the international
and national arenas, respectively. For now it is sufficient to state that this
projection has not been produced pacifically, due to the enormous tension
existing between the extensive regulatory tradition and the powerful
liberalization trend.

Cf Ricardo Alonso Soto, Competencia y Desregulaci6n Econ6mica: los Informes del
6.
Tribunal de Defensa de la Competencia sobre la Liberalizaci6n de los Servicios [Competition and
Economic Deregulation: the Competition Defense Court Reports on the Liberalization of Services], in I
ESTUDIOS JuRiDicos EN HOMENAJE AL PROFESOR AURELIO MENENDEZ [LEGAL STUDIES IN HOMAGE TO

PROFESSOR AURELIO MENENDEZ] 653, 658-59 (Juan Luis Iglesias Prada coordinator, Civitas 1996); see
also TRIBUNAL DE DEFENSA DE LA COMPETENCIA [TDC]

[COMPETITION DEFENSE COURT],

LA

COMPETENCIA EN ESPAf4A: BALANCE Y NUEVAS PROPUESTAS [COMPETITION IN SPAIN: BALANCE AND

NEW PROPOSALS] (1995), availableat http://www.tdcompetencia.es/frames.asp?menu=5.
7.

Cf SORIANO GARCiA, supranote 5, at 9-13 & 57-60.
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EVOLUTION IN THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA

SupranationalOrganizations
1. Organizationfor Economic Co-operation andDevelopment (OECD)

In 1985, the OECD's Committee on Competition Law and Policy
presented a Report titled Competition Policy and the Professions
This
report concluded that in the majority of countries professions were not subject to competition rules and, in consequence, recommended to the States to
eliminate existing restrictions regarding access, price, advertising and
association structure, with the aim that "exceptions of competition Laws not
go beyond what is necessary and only serve to reach public interest aims." 9
Regarding access, it recommended that access systems be objective
and equitable, and that policies be created that would afford foreign professsionals the right to provide their services in both temporary and permanent
fashion. With regard to advertising, it suggested the adoption of measurements to assure that consumers be afforded sufficient information to choose
between different professionals. In reference to fees, it recommended that
the mandatory tariff fixations be submitted to review to avoid diversion
from the price setting freedom principle. In relation to professional corporations, it emphasized that the use of new business structures to provide
professional services could allow for a greater efficiency.
In the latest years, the OECD has insisted on the need to reduce
restrictions to the rendering of professional services, as the Conferences and
Round Tables celebrated on this issue in 1995, 1996, 1997 and 1999
demonstrate. As a consequence of these Conferences and Round Tables,
the Committee on Competition Law and Policy has elaborated diverse
Reports, among which stand out the following two: Report on Regulatory
Reform: Chapter 3, Regulatory Reform and Professional Business Services, of 1997; and Competition in Professional Services, of 2000.20
It is indicated in the above-mentioned Reports that, although the
concrete details vary according to the corresponding country, all of the
8.

ORGANIZATION

FOR

ECONOMIC

COMPETITION POLICY AND THE PROFESSIONS

9.

CO-OPERATION

AND

DEVELOPMENT

[OECD],

(1985).

Id.

10.
The documentation relative to the OECD's activities in this subject may be consulted at
http://www.oecd.org/daf/clp (last visited Apr. 10, 2005).
OECD, REPORT ON REGULATORY REFORM. VOLUME I: SECTORAL STUDIES 117 et seq. (1997)
[hereinafter REGULATORY REFORM REPORT]; OECD DIRECTORATE FOR FIN., FISCAL & ENTER. AFF.
[DAF], COMM. ON COMPETITION L. & POL'Y, COMPETITION IN PROFESSIONAL SERVICES,

DAF Doc.

DAFFE/CLP(2000)2 (Feb. 23, 2000), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/35/4/1920231.pdf
[hereinafter COMPETITION IN PROFESSIONAL SERVICES].
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OECD countries regulate certain professional activities, either directly or by
delegating normative legal authority to the professional organizations.
Likewise, in many of these countries the fact that regulation of professions
produces the effect of restricting free competition in the professional
services market, resulting in the rise of their prices, reducing their variety
and limiting innovation, is of special concern. In particular, professional
organizations' use of the normative legal authority they are delegated to
develop competition restrictive practices is worrisome. In this regard, it is
observed that in New Zealand it has been proposed to create an autonomous
entity whose purpose would be to supervise the norm approved by the
attorneys' professional association (New Zealand Law Society" ) . In view
of the previous, the Committee has proposed the following recommendations:
1)

2)

3)

4)

5)

An activity must only be exclusively reserved to a profession when there exists no other less restrictive competition mechanism to guarantee the quality of professional
services. In the event that there exists no other remedy but
to reserve an activity to a profession, the access requirements to the same must not be disproportionate with respect
to the qualities necessary to adequately develop the corresponding activity. Along this line, when the aptitudes
necessary for providing different services differ substantially, new professions must be created with different access
requirements.
The regulation of professions must center on protecting
smaller consumers, since larger consumers, such as large
corporations, are in the position to assess the quality of
professional services.
The restrictions on competition between members of a
profession must be eliminated. These restrictions include
agreements directed at determining the price, dividing the
markets, increasing the access requirements, or limiting
advertising. Likewise, the recognition of other countries'
professional degrees must be promoted, eliminating nationality and residency requirements.
Professional organizations must not possess exclusive
authority in deciding the access requirements, mutual recognition, or delimiting activities exclusively reserved.
Competition between professional organizations must be
promoted, provided mechanisms are established to assure
that the access requirements to a profession do not reduce

11.
NEW ZEALAND LAW SOCIETY, at http://www.nz-lawsoc.org.nz/hmaboutus.asp (last visited
Mar. 31,2005).
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the aptitudes required to practice the corresponding professsional activity.
Likewise, the Committee recognizes the progress that has taken place
in this matter and this is manifested in that nowadays almost all the OECD
states promote the competition of professional services and, with a few
exceptions, the competition law applies to the professional sector. In spite
of it, an emphasize exists that changes in this sector are still slow partly due
to the higher benefits that the professions obtain from the restrictions to
competition and to the resistance of professional organizations to
liberalization.
2.

World Trade Organization(WTO)

The WTO is, as known, a supranational organization created in 1994
after the commercial negotiations developed in the Uruguay Round, at the
core of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), with the
purpose to facilitate international cooperation on commercial and economic
relations. 12 The extraordinary growth of furnishing services in the
international arena and the interest to open the national service markets
enticed the United States, the largest exporter of services at a worldwide
level, to propose and finally obtain, in spite of some developing states'
strong reticence, the incorporation of services among the objects subject of
the international cooperation. This is the origin of the adoption, incident
with the WTO's creation, of the General Agreement on Trade in Services
(GATS), 13 by virtue of which WTO members States pledged to initiate a
process of multilateral negotiation, supervised by the WTO, with the
purpose to design a frame of principles
and rules directed towards
14
liberalizing the so called trade in services.
12.
WTO, What is the WTO?, at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatise/whatise.htm
(last
visited
Mar.
4,
2005);
WTO,
GATT
and
the
Goods Council,
at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/gate/gatt e.htm (last visited Mar. 4, 2005). Spain ratified the
agreement by which the WTO is established on December 30, 1994. Instrumento de Ratificaci6n del
Acuerdo por el que se establece la Organizaci6n Mundial del Comercio y del Acuerdo sobre
Contrataci6n Publica, Hechos en Marrakech el15 de abril de 1994 [Ratification Instrument of the Treaty
which establishes the WTO and the Agreement on Public Contracting, Actions in Marrakech Apr. 15,
1994], (Boletin Oficial del Estado [B.O.E.] [Official Bulletin of the State] 1995, 20) (Spain).
13.
WTO,
GATS
Fact
and
Fiction,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/serv_e/gats-factfiction e.htm (last visited Mar. 4, 2005).

at

14.
WTO, Services Trade, at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv-e/serv e.htm (last
visited Mar. 4, 2005). Regarding the liberalization of services of international commerce, see MANUEL
L6PEZ ESCUDERO, EL COMERCIO INTERNACIONAL DE SERViCIos DESPUtS DE LA RONDA URUGUAY
[INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE OF SERVICES AFTER THE URUGUAY ROUND] (Tecnos 1996); RiCARDO
GARCiA LWPEZ, LA LIBERALIZACION DEL COMERCIO DE SERV1CIOS EN LA OMC: UNA PERSPECTIVA
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Among the services object of the above-mentioned Agreement are
included professional services, among which those of law and audit are
expressly mentioned. This circumstance presumes to compare professsionals to other economic operators who provide services and can clearly be
classified as business enterprises, in relation to which they perform in
mercantile areas, such as banking, insurance, telecommunications, transport, etc. 15 To this effect, a Work Group was created in the heart of the
WTO with the task to analyze professional services. This Work Group has
already begun to study the law and audit services sector.
Parallel to what the GATT does in commodity trade matters, the
GATS proposes to liberalize international services trade by eliminating
unnecessary barriers such as, among others, import prohibitions or restrictions and the imposition of surcharges or fiscal charges. In the professional
services area, it is worth mentioning the barriers consisting in the exigency
of nationality, residency and degree or local university education requirements. In order to eliminate these barriers, the GATS predicts the introduction of diverse principles, among which stand out those that intend to avoid
discrimination of foreign services providers in lieu of nationals and,
concretely, the beginning of a national treatment, of a most favored nation
and of free market access. In the realm of professional services, the GATS
embraces the mutual recognition of degrees principle, by virtue of which
Member States will recognize professional degrees obtained in one of the
named States. Nevertheless, this principle possesses a very weak base,
since it allows the States to individually establish degree recognition
criteria. In spite of the previous, the Agreement foresees the possibility of
multilaterally adopting common international standards in matters of
professional degrees' recognition and professional practice.

EUROPEA [THE LIBERALIZATION OF THE COMMERCE OF SERVICES IN THE WTO:

A EUROPEAN

PERSPECTIVE] (Tirant lo Blanch, 2000). In this subject matter, it is necessary to point out that, unlike the
General Agreement on Trade in Services [GATS], the European Community Treaty reserved the term

"commerce" to mercantile commerce. Regarding this matter and its legal and political implications, see
GARcIA L6PEZ, supra, at 152-53.
15.

On the international liberalization of professional services and, particularly, legal services,

see John Toulmin Q.C., Commentary, A Worldwide Common Code of ProfessionalEthics, 15 FORDHAM
INT'L L.J. 673 (1992); Kenneth S. Kilirnik, Lawyers Abroad: New Rules for Practice in a Global
Economy, 12 DICK. J. INT'L L. 269 (1994); Spencer A. Sherman, Yankee Go Home: What's Left for
Lawyers After the GATT Debacle, 14 CAL. LAW. 65 (1994); Michael J. Chapman & Paul J. Tauber,
Liberalizing InternationalTrade in Legal Services: A Proposalfor an Annex on Legal Services Under
the General Agreement on Trade in Services, 16 MICH. J. INT'L L. 941 (1995); Mary E. Footer, The
InternationalRegulation of Trade in Services Following Completion of the Uruguay Round, 29 INT'L
LAW. 453 (1995); Mara M. Burr, Will the General Agreement on Trade in Services Result in
International Standards for Lawyers and Access to the World Market?, 20 HAMLNE L. REV. 667
(1997).
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The importance of this international liberalization of professions,
though still in a very incipient phase, takes root in that it also supposes a
liberalization of the professions in the national arena, because it facilitates
the elimination of competition restrictions of 6national character and the
establishment of common competition policies.
3.

European Community

The impact Community law has had exposing the professional sector
to free competition has been demonstrated essentially in two areas: the
professionals' movement freedom of in the community market and, more
recently, the application of Community Competition law to them.' 7 Though
it is true that, in principle, these two areas have directly influenced
competition in the community market, and not the national markets of each
Member State, it must be recognized that Community law has exercised
considerable "indirect" influence on the latter's markets, to such a degree it
has incited the States to advance in the direction of applying competition
rules to professionals in their respective internal markets. Concretely, as
stated by Mario Monti, the former Commissioner responsible for
competition policy, the European Commission intends its action to serve as
a catalyst of the reforms the states must accomplish regarding this matter.
Before analyzing the two mentioned areas separately, it is necessary to
state it has been particularly since the nineties when policies, as well as
community legislation and jurisprudence, have given a major impulse to the
16.
Cf Jestis Olavaria & Javier Viciano, Profesiones liberalesy Derecho de la Competencia:
Cronica de la situacion [Liberal Professions and Competition Law: Cronicle of the situation], Derecho
Privado y Constituci6n [Private Law and Constitution] , 1997, No. 11, at 201-348, esp. 244-45.
Regarding the interaction between competition policy and international commerce, see Miguel Montafia
Mora, La OMC y el Derecho de la Competencia: iHacia un Derecho de la Competencia Mundial?
[The WTO and Competition Law: Towards Worldwide Competition Law?], GJ, 1999, No. 200, at 6780.
17.
In this respect, see Ehlermann, supra note 2; Maria-Jos6 Bicho, Professions lib4rales:
aspects essentiels de I 'action de la Commission en matihre d'applicationdes rdgles de concurrence
[Liberal Professions: Essential Aspects of the Commissions Actions in Matters Concerning the
Application of Competition Rules], COMPETITION POL'Y NEWSLETTER, No. 2, at 24 (1999); Maria-Jose
Bicho, Concurrence dans les professions lib~rales:
quels avantages pour le consommateur?
(Competition of the liberal professions: what advantages for the consumer?], Speech before the
European Commission at the Journre europrenne de la concurrence [European Day of Competition],
Lisbon
(June
9,
2000),
available
at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/speeches/text/sp2000_017_fr.pdf;
Alexander
Schaub,
Europisches Wettbewerbsrecht und anwaltliches Berufsrecht [European Competition Law and Lawyer
Professional Law], anlal31ich des Parlamentarischen Abends des Deutschen Anwaltsvereins [at the
Occasion of the Parliamentary evening of the German lawyer association] (Sept. 26, 2001), availableat
http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/speeches/text/sp200_lOl 7de.pdf; Olavarria & Viciano, supra
note 16, at 229-43.
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application of competition rules to professionals and, therefore, have
influenced national legal systems more powerfully.
a. Professionals' Movement Freedom
By virtue of the European Community Treaty,' 8 professionals enjoy
movement freedom (article 3.1.c) and, as a complement of the previous,
establishment freedoms (articles 43-48, former articles 52-58) and to
provide services in any Member State (articles 49-55, former articles 5966).'9 In theory, recognition of professionals' movement freedom supposed
a substantial competition increase in the community professional services
market. Nevertheless, in practice the force of this freedom was observed to
The mentions made to this Treaty are referred to by the resulting new numeration of the
18.
Treaty of Amsterdam, ratified by Spain by means of the Organic Law No. 9/1998 of Dec. 16, 1998.
TREATY OF AMSTERDAM AMENDING THE TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION, THE TREATIES ESTABLISHING
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES AND CERTAIN RELATED ACTS, Oct. 2, 1997, O.J. (C 340) 1 (1997)

[hereinafter TREATY OF AMSTERDAM]; Ley Orginica [Organic Law] 9/1998, of Dec. 16 (B.O.E. 1998,
301) (Spain).
19.
Regarding professionals' movement freedom, see Nemesio Vara De Paz, La libertad de
establecimiento y la libre prestaci6n de servicios [Establishment Freedom and the Uninhibited
Rendering of Services], REVISTA DE DERECHO MERCANTIL [RDM] [COMMERCIAL L. REV.], No. 159, at
457-521 (1981); SANTIAGO MU1FJOZ MACHADO ET AL., LA LIBERTAD DE EJERCICIO DE LA PROFESI6N Y
EL PROBLEMA DE LAS ATRIBUCIONES DE LOS TECNICOS TITULADOS [THE FREEDOM OF PROFESSIONAL
PRACTICE AND THE PROBLEM OF THE ATrRIBUTIONS OF QUALIFIED TECHNICAL PROFESSIONALS] 177-

205 (Instituto de Estudios de Administraci6n Local [Inst. of Local Admin. Stud.] 1983); 1. Borrajo
Iniesta, Las libertades de establecimiento y de servicios en el Tratado de Roma [The Liberties of
Establishment and of Services in the Treaty of Rome], in 2 TRATADO DE DERECHO COMUNITARIO
EUROPEO: ESTUDIO SISTEMATICO DESDE EL DERECHO ESPAiOL [TREATY OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
LAW: A SYSTEMATIC STUDY FROM SPAIN'S LAWS] 190-200 (Eduardo Garcia de Enterria et al. dirs.,
Civitas 1986); MARIANO BAENA DEL ALCAZAR, LA LIBRE CIRCULACI6N DE PROFESIONALES Y SU
INCIDENCIA EN ESPA.IA (EJERCICIO DE PROFESIONES TITULADAS Y PLANES DE ESTUDIO)
[PROFESSIONALS' MOVEMENT FREEDOM AND ITS INCIDENCE IN SPAIN (PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE &
STUDY CURRICULUMS)] (Ministerio de Educaci6n y Ciencia, Consejo de Universidades [MEC] [Educ.
& Sci. Dep't, Universities'

Council]

1987); MARIANO BAENA DEL ALCAZAR, EUROPA Y LAS

PROFESIONES LIBERALES [EUROPE AND THE LIBERAL PROFESSIONS] (1989); SOUVIR6N MORENILLA,

supra note 11, at 181-274; LIBRE CIRCULACI6N DE PROFESIONALES LIBERALES EN LA CEE
[MOVEMENT FREEDOM OF LIBERAL PROFESSIONS IN THE EEC]

(Justino F. Duque Dominguez

coordinator, Lex Nova 1991); ANDREU OLESTI RAYO, LA LIBRE CIRCULACI6N DE LOS PROFESIONALES
LIBERALES EN LA C.E.E. [MOVEMENT FREEDOM OF LIBERAL PROFESSIONS IN THE E.E.C.] (Promociones
y Publicaciones Universitarias [PPU] [Univ. Promotions & Publ'ns] 1992); LUIS FERNANDEZ DE LA
GANADARA & ALFONSO-LUIS CALVO CARAVACA, DERECHO MERCANTIL INTERNACIONAL: ESTUDIOS
SOBRE DERECHO COMUN1TARIO Y DEL COMERCIO INTERNACIONAL [INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW:
STUDIES ON COMMUNITY LAW AND INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE] 17-126 (Tecnos 2d ed. 1995); Juan

Francisco Mestre Delgado, Libertadde Establecimientoy Libre Prestaci6n de Servicios Profesionales
en la Uni6n Europea [Establishment Freedom and Uninhibited Rendering of Professional Services in
the European Union], DERECHO PRIVADO Y CONSTITUCI6N [DPC] [PRIVATE LAW & CONST.], No. 11,

at 131-55 (1997); Olavarria & Viciano, supra note 16, at 230-31.
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be notably hindered by the subsistence of considerable access barriers,
manifested in the exigency of nationality and domicile requirements in the
receiving State, as well as in the diversity of access conditions and the
exercise of professional activities.
In this context, in the mid seventies the European Community's Court
of Justice (ECJ), in setting judgments in the Reyners 20 and Binsbergen 21
cases, expressly indicated that, independent of the absence of legal rules
derived in the Treaty's development, it possesses a direct effect when it
recognizes professionals have a right to establish themselves and provide
their services in any Member State under the same conditions as natives of
the receiving State, without requiring them to acquire nationality and
domicile in the latter State. In applying these rights, the Court declared, in
the Reyners case, the invalidity of the national rules requiring professionals
of other members States to possess the receiving State's nationality as an
access requisite to the profession in said State; 22 and, in the Binsbergen
case, the incompatibility with Community law of national rules consisting
of imposing residency in the receiving State to national professionals of
said State and legally competent in the profession in accordance with said
State's discipline, but with residence in another.23
Notwithstanding the previous jurisprudence, the practical virtuosity of
professionals' movement freedom continued being hindered by diverse
access and professional practice conditions. With the aim of eliminating
these restrictions, on December 18, 1961, the Council approved a general
program for suppressing restrictions to establishment freedom. In the
program's framework, the Council adopted a series of sectarian Directives
for the mutual recognition of professional degrees.24
20.

Case 2-74, Jean Reyners v. Belgian State, 1974 E.C.R. 631.
21.
Case 33-74, Johannes Henricus Maria van Binsbergen
Bedrijfsvereniging voor de Metaalnijverheid, 1974 E.C.R. 1299.

v.

Bestuur

van de

22.
Reyners was a Dutch citizen who, in spite of having obtained a Belgium law degree, was
denied the right to practice in Belgium because he was not a Belgian citizen.
23.
In this case, the legal practice was denied to a Dutch lawyer for having moved his
residence from a Member State where he was admitted into practice to another where he was not.
24.
This way, for example, Council Directive 77/249/EEC, 1977 O.J. (L 78) 17, directed at
facilitating the effective practice by lawyers of freedom to provide services, incorporated via Real
Decreto [R.D.] [Royal Decree] 607/1986 of Mar. 21 (B.O.E. 1986, 78) (Spain); Council Directive
67/43/EEC, 1967 J.O. (10) 140 relative to establishment freedom and freedom of providing services for
non wage-eaming activities included in the real-estatebusiness sector, incorporated via R.D. 1464/1988
of Dec. 2 (B.O.E. 1988, 294) (Spain); Council Directive 78/1026/EEC, 1978 O.J. (L 1026) 1 and
Directive 81/1057/EEC, 1981 O.J. (L 385) 25, relative to the mutual recognition of diplomas,
certificates and other veterinariandegrees, and Council Directive 78/1027/EEC, 1978 O.J. (L 362) 7, on
coordination of legislative, regulative and administrative dispositions relating to veterinarians' activities,
incorporated via R.D. 331/1989 of Mar. 17 (B.O.E. 1989, 81) (Spain); Council Directive 85/384/EEC,
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Later, the Council approved a general system of mutual degree
recognition, through the adoption of Directive 89/48/EEC, of the Council,
of December 21, 1988, relative to a general system of recognition of higher
education degrees that sanction professional trainings of a three years
minimum duration. 25 This Directive has been subsequently complemented
by the Directive 92/51/EEC, of the Council, of June 18, 1992, relative to a
second general system of recognition of professional trainings.26 The 1989
Directive, which has been incorporated into the Spanish order via Royal
Decree 1665/1991, of October 25 and the Ministerial Order of April 30,
1996, covers all the degrees not included in the sectarian Directives
referring to superior advancement educations with a three years minimum
duration, and allows professionals of a Member State to practice their
profession in any other Member State after having passed an exam or
having fulfilled the advancement complements eventually demanded by the

1985 O.J. (L 223) 15, Council Directive 85/614/EEC, 1985 O.J. (L 376) 1, and Council Directive
86/17/EEC, 1986 O.J. (L 27) 71, relative to the mutual recognition of diplomas, certificates and other
degrees in the architecture sector, including measures tending to facilitate the effective right to
establishment and freedom of providing services, incorporated via R.D. 1081/1989 of Aug. 28 (B.O.E.
1989, 214) (Spain); Council Directive 85/433/EEC, 1985 O.J. (L 253) 37, and Council Directive
85/584/EEC, 1985 O.J. (L 372) 42; relative to the mutual recognition of diplomas, certificates and titles
ofpharmaceutics,including measures tending to facilitate the effective right to establishment for certain
pharmaceutical activities, and the Council Directive 85/432/EEC, 1985 O.J. (L 253) 34, and Council
Directive 85/584/EEC, supra, on coordination of legislative, regulative and administrative dispositions
for certain pharmaceutical activities, incorporated via R.D. 1667/1989 of Dec. 22 (B.O.E. 1989, 4)
(Spain); Council Directive 75/362/EEC, 1975 O.J. (L 167) 1, Council Directive 81/1057/EEC, supra,
and Council Directive 82/76/EEC, 1982 O.J. (L 43) 21 relative to the mutual recognition of diplomas,
certificates and degrees of medicine, and the Council Directive 75/363/EEC, 1975 O.J. (L 167) 14, and
Council Directive 82/76/EEC, supra, on coordination of the legislative, regulative and administrative
dispositions relative to medical activities, incorporated via R.D. 1691/1989 of Dec. 29 (B.O.E. 1989, 13)
(Spain); Council Directive 78/686/EEC, 1978 O.J. (L 233) 1, Council Directive 78/687/EEC, 1978 O.J.
(L 233) 10, Council Directive 81/1057/EEC, supra, Council Directive 89/594/EEC, 1989 O.J. (L 341)
19, and Council Directive 90/658/EEC, 1990 O.J. (L 353) 73, relative to the mutual recognition of
diplomas, certificates and other dentistry degrees, including measures destined to facilitate the effective
practice of right to establishment and freedom of providing corresponding services within the
community area, incorporated via R.D. 675/1992 of June 19 (B.O.E. 1992, 178) (Spain).
25.
Council Directive 89/49/EEC for Council recommendation of 21 December 1988
concerning nationals of Member States who hold a diploma conferred in a third State, 1989 O.J. (L 19)
24. In this respect, see A. Carnamelutti, L 'Europe des professions libgrales: la reconnaissance
mutuelle des dipl6mes d'enseignement suprieur [The Europe of Liberal Professions: the mutual
recognition of diplomas of higher education], REVUE DU MARCHE UNIQUE EUROPEEN [R.M.U.E.]
[UNIQUE EUROPEAN MARKET REV.], No. 1, at 23-46 (1991).
26.
Council Directive 92/51/EEC of 18 June 1992 on a second general system for the
recognition of professional education and training to supplement Directive 89/48/EEC, 1992 O.J. (L
209) 25.
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receiving State. 27 This Directive is based, thus, on the mutual confidence
between the members States and on the supposed equivalence of their
professionals' advancement levels.
In actuality, and in the Project SLIM's framework, of Simplification of
the Market Interior's Legislation, a Parliament and Council Directive
Proposal is being discussed, by which the Council Directives 89/48/EEC
and 92/51/EEC are modified, as well as sectarian Directives relative to the
nurse responsible for general citizens, dentist, veterinarian, matron,
architect, pharmacist and doctor professions.2 8
A step forward in eliminating obstacles to professionals' movement
freedom is constituted by the automatic degree recognition system, in which
the recognition stops being determined by exam completions or supplementary practice periods. An example of this system, though referred
exclusively to the legal profession, is the Directive 98/5/EC, of the
European Parliament and the Council, of February 16, 1998, destined to
facilitate an attorney's permanent professional practice in a Member State
different from the one where the degree has been obtained. 29
An early precedent of this community norm is constituted in the
Council Directive 77/249/EEC, of March 22, 1977, directed at facilitating
the effective practice of attorneys' freedom of providing services,3 ° that has
been incorporated in Spain via the Royal Decree 607/1986, of March 21,
and in benefit of which community attorneys can provide their services with
a degree originating in any Member State, though only in the occasional
practice regime, not permanent.
More ambitious than the latter, Directive 98/5/EC, that has been
incorporated in Spain via Royal Decree 936/2001, of August 3, recognizes
community attorneys have, essentially, two rights, referring to the
permanent legal practice in a Member State different from the one where
the degree has been obtained: on one hand, the right to practice with the

R.D. 1665/1991 of Oct. 25 (B.O.E. 1991, 280) (Spain); Orden de 30 de abril de 1996 por
27.
la que se desarrolla el R.D. 1665/1991, de 25 de octubre, en lo que afecta a las profesiones de abogado y
procurador [Order of Apr. 30, 1996 by which the R.D. 1665/1991, of Oct. 25, is developed in what it
affects the lawyer and barrister professions] (B.O.E. 1996, 112) (Spain).
See Rafael Pellicier, Directiva que modifica los sistemas de reconocimiento de las
28.
calificaciones profesionales [Directive that modifies the systems that recognize the qualifications of
professionals], UNION PROFESIONAL [UP] [PROFESSIONAL UNION]?, No. 66, at 13 (2001); Directive

92/5 1/EEC, supra note 26.
Directive 98/5/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 February 1998 to
29.
facilitate practice of the profession of lawyer on a permanent basis in a Member State other than that in
which the qualification was obtained, 1998 O.J. (L 77) 36.
30.

Council Directive 77/249/EEC, supranote 24.
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degree of origin; and,3 on the other hand, the right to acquire attorney status
in the receiving State. 1
Parallel to the approval of the mentioned Directives, the ECJ has been
considered to be opposite to community norm, for weakening the professsionals' movement freedom, some of the competition restrictions gathered
in the national legal systems. 2
Along this line, the Judgment of July 12, 1984, 33 considered incompatible with Community law the so-called "cabinet unit" requisite, grouped
in the French norm, in virtue of which it is possible to have only one
principal attorney's office opened to the public or, inclusive, secondary
offices, but all of which must always be inside the territorial limits of the
"grand instance" Courts. According to the Court, establishment freedom
means that all professionals, without abandoning their office, may open a
new one in another Member State. This was confirmed anew in the
Judgment of May 20, 1992, 34 in relation with account auditors; and in that
of June 16, 1992, 35 in relation with doctors. It was indicated in the latter,
additionally, that so-called "clinic unit" requirement is not justified by the
attention to the patient, given that the proximity between doctor and patient
is not continuously necessary. More recently, the Judgment of January 18,
2001, declared that subordinating the enrollment in the dentists' Association and, therefore, their professional practice, to the requirement to reside
in the territorial area allotted to the Professional Association in which they
In as much as it refers to the first right, its exercise requires the attorney's inscription
31.
before the receiving State's competent authority (art. 3), who will then be able to develop in such State
the same professional activities as the attorneys who practice with the diploma of said State and,
particularly, to give legal advice in legal matters of the originating State, Community Law, International
Law and the receiving State's Law (art. 5.1). Notwithstanding, the Directive does not recognize
unconditionally the right to practice with the originating diploma, since it authorizes the Member States
to limit this right establishing some restrictions as, for example, demanding that the attorneys who
intend to perform before jurisdictional entities do it concertedly with an attorney of the receiving State
(art. 5.3). Directive 98/5/EC, supra note 29.
In as much as it refers to the right to acquire attorney status in the receiving State, the Directive
dispenses of the aptitude test established by the Directive 89/48/EEC of professional degree recognition,
substituting this requisite for a period of legal practice in the receiving State with the diploma from the
originating State, for which is necessary the justification of an effective and consistent activity before
the receiving State's competent authority, with a minimal three year duration, in the receiving State in its
State Law ambit, including Community Law (art. 10). Council Directive 89/48/EEC, 1989 O.J. (L 19)
16.
R.D. 936/2001 of Aug. 3 (B.O.E. 2001, 186) (Spain).
32.

See Olavarria & Viciano, supra note 16, at 232-33.

33.

Case 107/83, Ordre des Advocats au Barreau de Paris v. Onno Klopp, 1984 E.C.R. 2971.

Case 106/91, Claus Ramrath v. Ministre de la Justice, and l'nstitut des rdviseurs
34.
d'entreprises, 1992 E.C.R. 1-3351.
35.

Case 351/90, Commission v. Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, 1992 E.C.R. 1-3945.
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seek to register, such as occurs in Italy, constitutes a restriction to the
worker's establishment and movement freedom, to the extent that such
requirement prevents dentists established or resident in another Member
State from opening another office or practicing their activity on their own in
the first State's territory.3 6 This same judgment established that a national
norm that exclusively reserves the right to maintain their enrollment in the
Association to dentists that are nationals of the Member State in case they
relocate their residence to another European Community Member State is
discriminatory because of the nationality requirement, contrary to the
Treaty provisions.
The Judgment of July 25, 1991,37 rejected as disproportionate the
exclusive reservation of industrial property agents' activity to certain
professionals. In this same approach, but in relation with pharmacists, two
Judgments of March 21, 1991, should be mentioned.3 8 Likewise, the
Judgments of February 26, 1991, 39 and of May 4,1991,40 also rejected as
disproportionate the mandatory association membership to engage in the
tourist guide activity. In all these cases, the Court has applied the so-called
criterion of proportionality with the general interest the above-mentioned
restrictions aim to achieve.4 '
Nonetheless, in other cases the ECJ has confirmed the community
legality of traditional professional associations. In this manner, the Judgment of January 19, 1988, considered the compulsory association membership of attorneys was not contrary to Community law, as long as it was
required of the State's nationals, pointing out that the specific purpose that
justifies the compulsory nature is "the guarantee of morality and respect for
deontological principles, as well as disciplinary control of the attorney's
activities. 42 Pronounced in the same sense were the judgments of
September 22, 1983, 43 and of April 30, 1986, 44 allowing the compulsory
36.

Case C-1 62/99, Commission v. Italian Republic, 2001 E.C.R. 1-541.

37.

Case C-76/90, Manfred Sager v. Dennemeyer & Co. Ltd., 1991 E.C.R. 1-4221.

38.
Case C-60/89, Criminal proceedings against Jean Monteil and Daniel Samanni, 1991
E.C.R. 1-1547.
39.

Case C-154/89, Commission v. French Republic, 1991 E.C.R. 1-659.

40.
Case C-340/89, Irene Vlassopoulou v. Ministerium
Europaangelegenheiten Baden-Wtirttemberg, 1991 E.C.R. 1-2357.

ftirJustiz,

Bundes-

und

41.
See Francisco Vicent Chulid, Poderes Pdblicos y Derecho de la Competencia [Public
Powers and Competition Law], REVISTA GENERAL DE DERECHO [RGD] [GEN. L. REV.] 3313, 3326-27
(1993), who mentions a duty of loyalty of the Member States to the community Treaties and, especially,
to the rules on competition freedom.
42.
Case 292/86, Claude Gullung v. Conseil de l'Ordre des Avocats du Barreau de Colmar et
de Saveme, 1988 E.C.R. 111.
43.

Case 271/82, Vincent Rodolphe Auer v. Minist~re public, 1983 E.C.R. 2727.
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association membership of veterinarians, doctors and dentists, indicating
that practicing these professions in the territory of other States must be
subject to rules in force in the receiving State.
The above-mentioned Judgment of July 12, 1984, pointed out that the
existence of a second professional domicile in another Member State does
not hinder the application of the deontological rules of the receiving
Member State. And, finally, the also mentioned Judgment of January 19,
1988, pointed out that the access prohibition or expulsion from the professsion for motives of dignity, good reputation and integrity established in a
Member State constitute valid obstacles to practice the same profession in
another Member State.
In spite of the fact that theoretically the Directives mentioned above
enormously facilitate the professionals' movement freedom in the Community ambit, it is true that in practice the mobility of such professionals in
said ambit is still, in general, scarce enough and, thus, it must evolve
considerably in order to answer the needs of undertakings in a market
without national borders.4 5 In view that the numerous measurements the
Community has adopted and is adopting with the purpose of obtaining this
objective seem to not be sufficient; competition policy can play a decisive
role in this aspect.46
b.

Application of Competition Law

The application of the Community Competition law to the professional
sector constitutes a relatively recent policy that is still in an incipient phase
of its development. This circumstance is explained, fundamentally, by the
fact that in the majority of cases professional practice is characterized for
spreading out in a territorial area generally limited to local borders or, as
much, national ones, which prevents in principle the application of
community competition norm, one of whose assumptions is the cause of
harm to commerce among the States.4 7
Since the beginning of the nineties, and in the framework of a policy
promoted at the request of the European Parliament, the Commission is
applying directly to professionals and their associations the competition
defense rules contained in the Treaty (articles 81-86, former articles 85-

44.

Case 96/85, Commission v. French Republic, 1986 E.C.R. 1475.

45.

Cf Ehlermann, supra note 2, at 142.

46.

Cf id.

47.

Cf id. at 143.
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This policy replaces the restriction that supposed the fact that, to
eliminate a competition restriction, it would be necessary to justify that the
restriction constituted an obstruction to professionals' movement freedom.
On the contrary, the direct application of Community competition law does
not require the existence of an obstruction to professionals' movement
freedom, which undoubtedly supposes a substantial advancement in this
matter.
In relation with this matter, it is worth a mentioning that the
90).48

Commission, in their XXIX Report on Competition Policy, 49 established the

following:
The Commission is developing its approach towards the issues
involved in applying the competition rules to the professions. In
the case of several of the professions, services are as yet still provided on a national or even local level, and the condition that
intra-Community trade must be appreciably affected for the EC
Treaty rules on competition to apply is therefore not met in most
of the cases encountered by the Commission.
Competition policy in this area pursues to main objectives: (1)
putting an end to restrictive practices; and (2) promoting forms of
cooperation that facilitate access to other geographic markets,
thereby enabling members of the professions to operate at Community or international level. The Commission's action focuses
primarily on cases that have a Community dimension in that they
concern the rules governing the same profession in all or at least
several Member States or, in the case of the members of a profession in a single Member State, relate to a restrictive practice
that has a significant impact in several Member States.
The Commission is endeavouring gradually to draw the dividing
line between purely ethical rules which lie outside the scope of
the competition provisions and rules or practices whose object or
effect is contrary to Article 81 of the Treaty. The goal of promoting competition in the professions is thus, in each individual
case, reconciled with the objective of maintaining purely ethical
rules specific to each profession.

48.

Cf Olavarria & Viciano, supra note 16, at 235; VALENTINE

KoRAH, INTRODUCCION AL

DERECHO Y PRACTICA DE LA COMPETENCIA EN LA C.E.E. [INTRODUCTION TO COMPETITION LAW AND

PRACTICE IN THE E.E.C.] 29 (Alejandro Fernindez de Ardoz G6mez-Acebo trans., Ariel 1988).

49.
EUROPEAN COMMISSION, XXIX REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 1999 (BrusselsLuxembourg 2000), available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/annuaLreports/1999/en.pdf
[hereinafter XXIX REPORT].
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The Commission has so far published four decisions concerning
the application of Article 81 of the Treaty to the behavior of a
professional body (CNSD, COAPI and EPI). 50 In the first three
decisions, the Commission found that collective price-fixing was
incompatible with the common market, irrespective of the
national regulatory framework . . . . The fourth decision
relates ... particularly [to] restrictions on advertising and
unsolicited offers of services ....
The above cases have already made it possible to develop the
main principles governing the application of the competition
rules to the professions:
Members of the professions are normally undertakings within the
meaning of Article 81 of the Treaty where they carry on their
activities as self-employed persons, and their professional bodies
or associations, to which all the members of a given profession
belong, may according to the circumstances be regarded as
associations of undertakings.
The collective fixing of prices and the prohibition of certain
forms of advertising by a professional association may constitute
restrictions of competition within the meaning of Article 81(1) of
the Treaty.
Rules which are necessary, in the specific context of each
profession, in order to ensure the impartiality, competence,
integrity and responsibility of the members of that profession or
to prevent conflicts of interest and misleading advertising are not
considered to be restrictions of competition within the meaning
of Article 81(1) of the Treaty.
The legal framework within which agreements are made and the
classification given to that framework under the various national
laws are irrelevant as far as the applicability of the Community
rules on competition are concerned. The Court of Justice has
repeatedly confirmed this principle 51

50.
Commission Decision 93/438/EEC of 30 June 1993 (IV/33.407 - CNSD) (only the Italian
text is authentic), 1993 O.J. (L 203) 27; Commission Decision 95/188/EC of 30 January 1995
(IV/33.686 - Coapi) (only the Spanish text is authentic), 1995 O.J. (L 122) 37; Commission Decision
1999/267/EC of 7 April 1999 (IV/36.147 EPI code of conduct) (Text with EEA relevance) (notified
under document number C(1999) 494), 1999 O.J. (L 106) 14; Commission Decision 2005/8/EC of June
24 2004 (COMP/A.38549 - Belgian Architects' Association) (notified under document number C(2004)
2180), 2005 O.J. (L 004) 10.
51.

Inter alia Joined Cases 43/82 and 63/82, VERENIGING TER BEVORDERING VAN HET

VLAAMSE

BOEKWEZEN, VBVB, AND VERENIGING TER BEVORDERING VAN DE BELANGEN DES

BOEKHANDELS,

VBBB,

v. COMMISSION,

1984

E.C.R.

19;

CASE

123/83,

Bureau

national
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Even if by delegating to a professional association power to fix
the prices to be charged by its members a Member State may be
infringing the rules of the Treaty, the association's exercise of
does not escape the application of Article 81 of the
that power
53
Treaty52
In their XXX Report on Competition Policy, the Commission has
progressed along the same line calling on the Member States, the
professionals, the Professional Associations, as well as consumers and their
organizations.5 4 On the Member States, in order to progress via the
liberalization of the sector, to clarify the norm to prevent it from being
applied solely to protect the economic interests of the liberal professions
members without guaranteeing, however, the quality of the services. On
the professionals, in order for them to compete in an effective and loyal
manner by means of individual and free establishment of their prices, to
inform precisely on the conditions of the services they provide and their
specific technical knowledge, through innovation in their services and their
way of providing them and through penetrating cross-border markets. On
the Professional Associations, in order that they give up the pressures they
exercise on sovereign powers with views on preventing liberalization and
guaranteeing economic advantages whose benefits are illusory in the long
term, to take into account the worldwide evolution of the service markets.
And on the consumers and their organizations, to be more demanding
regarding the information available on the professional services and the
price to be paid, so they can compare before making a decision and also
denounce to the national authorities or the European Commission the
practices that falsify the competition game.
Recently, the EU Commission launched a review proposal of
professional regulationby commissioning an independent study to-compare
the regulations affecting lawyers, notaries, accountants, architects,
engineers and pharmacists in all Member States which was published in
March 2003. Issuing a Report to set out the Commission's view as to the
potentiality of modernizing professional regulation which was adopted in
February 2004"s. The study showed significantly different levels of
interprofessionnel du cognac v. Guy Clair, 1985 E.C.R. 391; and, Case C-35/96, Commission v. Italian
Republic, 1998 E.C.R. 1-3851.
52.

Commission Decision 95/188/EC of 30 January, 1995 O.J. (L 122) 37.

53.

XXIX REPORT, supranote 49, at 53-54.

54.

EUROPEAN COMMISSION, XXX REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 2000, at 48 (Brussels

2001), availableat http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/annualreports/2000/en.pdf.
55.
See INSTITUT FOR HOHERE STUDIEN [Institutefor High Studies]_(IHS), Economic impact
of regulation in the field of liberalprofessions in different Member States. Regulation of Professional
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regulation between Member States and also between different professions.
It also found that there was no indication of malfunctioning of markets in
relatively less regulated countries. On the contrary, the conclusion of the
study was that more freedom in the professions would allow more overall
wealth creation. The Commission identified those groups of regulatory
restrictions in the professions which have the biggest potential to harm
competition without being objectively justified:j(i) price fixing, (ii)
recommended prices, (iii) advertising regulations, (iv) entry requirements
and reserved rights, and (v) regulations governing business structure and
multi-disciplinary practices. Accordingly, the Commission would like to see
those restrictions reviewed and, where they are not objectively justified,
removed or replaced by less restrictive rules. The Commission, therefore,
invited,first, the regulatory authorities of the Member States to review the
legislation or regulations within their report, and also invited all
professionalbodies to start a similar review of their rules and regulations.
In this context, it is of interest to make a more detailed analysis of the
Commission's Decisions aforementioned. In the first three Decisions the
Commission determined that the adopted fixing of fees for professional
services, in the first case, by the Italian Consiglio Nazionale degli
Spedizionieri Doganali (CNSD, National Council of Customs Agents) 56 ; in
the second one, by the Spanish Colegio Oficial de Agentes de la Propiedad
Agents); 57
Industrial (COAPI, Official Association of Industrial Property
and in the third one by the Belgian Ordre des Architectes OA
(Architects' Association), constituted a decision by an association of
undertakings prohibited by article 81 (former article 85) of the Treaty.5 8 In
relation with these Decisions, it is worth emphasizing the following aspects
relative to the subjective and objective area of application of the community
competition norm.
First, in relation with the subjective area, the Commission affirms that
the mentioned professionals (customs agents, industrial property agents and
architects) are undertakings to the effects of article 81 (former article 85) of
the Treaty, without their consideration as professionals modify such
affirmation. This qualification is based on the adoption of a broad underServices, Vienna 2003; and EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Report on Competition in Professional Services,
Brussels, February 9, 2004.
CONSIGLIO NAZIONALE DEGLI SPEDIZIONIERI DOGANALI [CNSD] [NATIONAL COUNCIL
56.
OF CUSTOMS AGENTS], at http://www.cnsd.it/ (last visited Mar. 27, 2005).
COLEGIO OFICIAL DE AGENTES DE LA PROPIEDAD INDUSTRIAL [COAPI] [OFFICIAL
57.
ASSOCIATION OF INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY AGENTS], at http://www.coapi.org/home.htm (last visited Mar.

27, 2005).
58.

Commission Decision 93/438/EEC, supra note 50; Commission Decision 95/188/EC,

supra note 50; TREATY OF AMSTERDAM, supra note 18, at art. 81 (old art. 85).
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taking concept and, concretely, of the adopted Judgment of April 23, 1991
in the case HOfner, by virtue of which "the concept of an undertaking
encompasses every entity engaged in an economic activity, regardless of the
legal status of the entity and the way in which it is financed .... It deals,
hence, with a concept that gives priority to functional or economic aspects
of the activity, dispensing with the formal or legal aspects. In consequence,
the Associations that group those professionals consider themselves
associations of undertakings, without altering said qualification the fact that
its status is that of public law entities or of public interest associations and
that the public powers attribute to them control and discipline functions of
their respective professions.
It is interesting to emphasize also that the Commission's conclusion is
not hindered by the fact that the agreement of fixing fees is permitted by
Law and is approved subsequently by the Government. This because, on
one hand, the Law does not force the regulation of fees, it merely permits it,
which does not prevent the application of competition rules; and, on the
other hand, because the approval by the Government does not prevent the
previous and autonomous existence of an agreement by an association of
undertakings. In this regard, it should be recalled that, according to
constant E.C.J. jurisprudence, the community competition norm not only
links undertakings, but also the Members States, who cannot adopt or keep
in effect measures capable of eliminating the useful purpose of the
mentioned norm. This happens when States impose or favor the adoption
of behaviors contrary to free competition on the part of the economic
operators, or when they delegate to these operators the regulation of their
economic relationships. 60 For this motive, the Commission began violation
proceedings against Italy in relation to the Italian legislation that regulates
the customs agents' profession, proceedings that gave rise to the ECJ
Judgment of June 18, 1998,61 which determined that Italy had violated the
obligations imposed by the Treaty regarding competition by adopting and
maintaining a Law that gives the CNSD the power of adopting a decision
adverse to article 81 of the Treaty, thus confirming the Commission's
resolution. Likewise, it must be pointed out that the judgment regarding the

59.

Case C-41/90, Klaus Hofner and Fritz Elser v. Macroton GmbH, 1991 E.C.R. 1-1979.

60.
Id. at 21. On the existing relations between national and community competition laws,
see Luis FemAndez de la Gindara & Alfonso Luis Calvo Caravaca, Politica y Derecho de la
Competencia en la CEE: Una Aproximacidn [Politics and Competition Law in the EEC: An
Approximation], RGD, No. 583, at 3379-3447 (1993).
61.

Case C-35/96, Commission v. Italian Republic, 1998 E.C.R. 1-3851.
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CNSD was appealed before the Court of First Instance, which on March 30,
2000, rendered a verdict confirming the Commission's decision.62
Secondly, with regard to the objective area of application, the
Commission affirms that in these cases fixing fees constitutes a restrictive
competition agreement that can notably harm commerce between Member
States. It deals with a restriction, because the Association agreements are
binding on all its members and are applied by exercising sanctioning
powers attributed to such Associations, preventing the professionals from
individually establishing remuneration for their services. In the Belgian
architects' case the Commission declared that even the recommended fee
scale is against competition, because it facilitates price coordination of the
conduct of the members of the association in accordance with the terms of
the recommendation.
Furthermore, the clear requisite of harm to Community commerce is
interpreted extensively, in considering that such requirement is met, in case
of customs agents, because the restriction spreads its effects on all the
imports to Italy and all the exports from Italy; in the industrial property
agents' case, because it reaches all the demand volume coming from clients
residing abroad, monopolized by the Spanish agents, and a considerable
part of the Spanish clients' demand directed abroad, in which the Spanish
agents held a predominant position; and in the architects' case, since the
restriction applies throughout Belgium and to any other architect in the
country, including nationals of other Member States registered with the
Association.
The Commission's fourth Decision of April 7, 1999, EPI, is the first
that deals with the restrictions to advertising and professional services
offers and, specifically, the provisions contained in the code of conduct of
the European Patent Institute (EPI), 63 a professional organization that
groups at the European level agents authorized by the European Patent
Office. 64 This Decision distinguishes in the aforementioned code of
conduct between provisions that possess a deontological nature and those
that restrict competition. Among the first, it enumerates all those necessary
to guarantee impartiality, aptitude, integrity and agents' responsibility, to
avoid conflicts of interests and misleading advertising or to guarantee the
effective functioning of the European Patent Office. These rules are not
Case T-513/93, Consiglio Nazionale degli Spedizionieri Doganali v. Commission, 2000
62.
E.C.R. 11-1807.
63.

INSTITUTE OF PROFESSIONAL REPRESENTATIVES BEFORE THE EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE

[EPI], THE EUROPEAN PATENT INSTITUTE, at http://216.92.57.242/patentepi/english/100/index.php (last
at
13,
1979),
(Nov.
OF
CONDUCT
CODE
EPI,
1,
2005);
Mar.
modified
http://216.92.57.242/patentepi/english/100/120/121/.
64.

Commission Decision 1999/267/EC, supranote 50.
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considered restrictive of competition in the context of the mentioned
profession.
On the other hand, the rules that prohibit performing
comparative advertising under the conditions contemplated in Directive
97/55/CE 65 and providing services to former clients of other agents are
considered competition restrictions that that infringe on article 81(1)
(former article 85) of the Treaty.66 By means of the Judgment of March 28,
2001, the Court of First Instance decided on the appeal EPI raised against
the cited Decision, confirming the legality of the same in considering the
absolute prohibition of comparative advertising to be restrictive, although
disallowing it in regards to the prohibition on the offering of services to
former clients of other agents, having understood that said prohibition's
objective is to prevent that while offering services to a client, an agent
denigrates a colleague, questioning the intervention of the latter in a
concluded matter.67
Still, it is necessary to recall, as pointed out above, the recent controversy the Commission and the European Parliament confront regarding this
matter. On one side, in March, 2001, the Commission announced the
initiation of an investigation on professional practice competition restrictions contained in the legislation of diverse Member States, with the
purpose of proposing their elimination and, especially, the ones relating to
the fixing of fees, including the establishment of guidance scales. Yet, on
April 5, 2001, the Parliament approved a Resolution, initiated by its
Commission on Legal Matters and Domestic Markets, in which it expressly
emphasized "the importance .. . [of] compulsory tariffs with a view to
granting high quality services to citizens and to create trustful relationships
between liberal professions and their clients. 68 For this motive, it was

65.
Directive 97/55/EC of European Parliament and of the Council of 6 October 1997
amending Directive 84/450/EEC concerning misleading advertising so as to include comparative
advertising, 1997 O.J. (L 290) 18.
66.
In this respect, it must be indicated that the Commission agreed to an exemption of the
prohibition of the restrictive conduct mentioned for a transitory period that ended April 23, 2000. This
exemption was justified with the purpose of avoiding risks of confusion for consumers that could be
brought about by the brusque transition of the traditional regime of almost absolute advertising
prohibition to a system of freedom in this matter, with it allowing professionals as much as consumers to
have a transitory period of adjustment to a new situation.
67.
Case T-144/99, Institute of Professional Representatives before the European Patent Office
v. Commission, 2001 E.C.R. 11-1087.
68.
European Parliament resolution on scale fees and compulsory tariffs for certain liberal
professions, in particular lawyers, and on the particular role and position of the liberal professions in
modem society, EUR. PARL. Doc. (520011P0247) (2001); Ana Palacio Vallelersundi Motion for a
Resolution on Compulsory Tariffs for Certain Liberal Professions, in ParticularLawyers, Eur. ParI.
Doc. PE298.398/1-37 (Feb. 15, 2001), at 5.
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affirmed that "[only a] few compulsory tariffs . . established by
professional bodies or associations of all members of a given profession
may according to the circumstances, be regarded as decisions adopted by
associations of undertakings submitted to the competition rules," so that
Members States are authorized to establish obligatory tariffs taking
into account the general interests (and not only the interest of the
profession), and to protect the high moral, ethical and quality standards that
lawyers, tax consultants, accountants, doctors, psychotherapists, architects
and other liberal professions stand for in which their clients trust.6 9
In view of this, the mentioned Resolution "calls upon the European
Commission to follow strictly the interpretation of the Court of Justice in
the application of competition rules to the obligatory tariffs of liberal
professions, specially lawyers ....
"'7
Finally, in the area of jurisprudence, it is worth mentioning two recent
Judgments of the Community's Court of Justice, both with date of February
19, 2002, in which the subjugation of professionals to the community
competition regime was discussed.7 l
In the first of the judgments (Arduino case7 2), the question of
collective fixing of professional fees was thoroughly examined. In this
case, an Italian court, in the frame of a liquidation of procedural coasts,
raised to the Community Court the issue of whether fixing a scale that
establishes the minimum and maximum limits for attorneys' fees infringes
on Community Competition law. Previously, it is necessary to mention that
the Italian legislation envisages that the National Council of Bar
Associations, composed exclusively of attorneys chosen by their own
colleagues, proposes an attorney's fees scale, which should be approved by
the Department of Justice after an advisory process before two public
bodies.
On this resolution, see Jos6 Luis Berenguer, Deontologia Profesional y Libre Competencia
[Professional Deontology and Free Competition], EXPANSI6N, Apr. 27, 2001; Rafael Pellicer,
Propuestade Resoluci6n del ParlamentoEuropeo de 7 de marzo de 2001 Relativa a la Aplicaci6n del
Derecho de la Competencia al Sector Profesional [Resolution Offer from the European Parliamentof
March 7, 2001 Relative to the Application of CompetitionLaw in the ProfessionalSector], IP, No. 66, at

20-21 (2001).
69.
EUR. PARL. DOc. (520011P0247), supra note 68; Eur. Parl. Doc. PE298.398/1-37, supra
note 68, at 9a 7-8.
70.
EUR. PARL. DOc. (520011P0247), supra note 68; Eur. Parl. Doc. PE298.398/1-37, supra
note 68, at 6.
71.
Case C-35/99, Criminal proceedings against Manuele Arduino, 2002 E.C.R. 1-1529; Case
C-309/99, J. C. J. Wouters, J. W. Savelbergh and Price Waterhouse Belastingadviseurs BV v. Algemene
Raad van de Nederlandse Orde van Advocaten, intervener: Raad van de Balies van de Europese
Gemeenschap, 2002 E.C.R. 1-1577.
72.

Case C-35/99, Criminal proceedings against Manuele Arduino, 2002 E.C.R. 1-1529.
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The Luxembourg Court resolved the case issuing the following
doctrine: Community Competition law is not opposed to Member States
adopting legislative or regulatory measures that approve, based on a project
elaborated by the Council of Bar Associations, a scale that fixes minimum
and maximum fee limits of members of the professions, provided the
aforementioned measure is adopted in the framework of a proceeding such
as that envisaged by the Italian legislation. Specifically, the Court declared
the fact that a State assigns to a professional organization the development
of a fee scale project does not automatically deprive the scale of its state
character. Though it is true that the Italian legislation does not contain
substantive or procedural standards that guarantee the Council of attorneys
follow general interest criteria at the time of developing the scale, the state
has not renounced its right to exercise its authority of deciding as the last
resort or to control the application of the scale. On the one hand, the scale
project lacks in itself compulsory force, since it does not come into effect
without the approval of the Department of Justice, allowing the Department
to force the Council to modify the scale project or simply not approve it.
On the other hand, in the judicial application of the scale, the courts may,
via a duly motivated decision, move away from the maximum and
minimum limits fixed by the scale.
In the second of the Judgments (Wouters case 73), mentioned above, it
was judged whether the prohibition of practicing multiple disciplines by
attorneys and auditors was compatible with the community competition
rules, contained in the multidisciplinary practice Regulation approved in
1993 by the Dutch Council of the Legal Profession. The Court, following
its own jurisprudence, recognized that for the purpose of article 81 (former
article 85) of the Treaty, the attorneys constitute undertakings and the
attorneys' professional associations constitute associations of undertakings.
Parting from this base, it understood the prohibition of multidisciplinary
collaboration of attorneys and auditors constitutes a restrictive agreement
on competition. Specifically, this prohibition limits the production and
technical development in the legal and auditing services sector, preventing
advantages linked to multidisciplinary practice, such as the increase in the
quality and diversity of services, their cost reduction or centralization in one
organization (one-stop shopping).
Nevertheless, the Court found that not every decision of an association
of undertakings that restricts competition is necessarily included in the
prohibition of article 81.1 of the Treaty. In this manner, it declared it is
necessary to analyze the global context in which the decision is placed and,
73.
Case C-309/99, J. C. J. Wouters, J. W. Savelbergh and Price Waterhouse
Belastingadviseurs BV v. Algemene Raad van de Nederlandse Orde van Advocaten, intervener: Raad
van de Balies van de Europese Gemeenschap, 2002 E.C.R. 1-1577.
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particularly, its objectives, which in this case were concentrated on the
function of guaranteeing the respect of the deontological principles of the
legal profession and, especially independence and professional secrecy. In
this regard, the Judgment indicated that "there may be a degree of
incompatibility between the advisory activities carried out by a member of
the Bar and the supervisory activities carried out by an accountant., 74 For
this reason, the Dutch Council of the Legal Profession was able to consider
that the prohibition discussed was necessary to guarantee the proper
practice of the law, without being able to obtain the same objective by less
restrictive means. The Court concluded the prohibition of multidisciplinary
practice of attorneys and auditors by the Regulation of the Dutch Council of
the Legal Profession "does not infringe Article 85(1) of the Treaty, since
that body could reasonably have considered that the regulation, despite the
effects restrictive of competition inherent in it, is necessary for the proper
practice of the legal profession, as organized in the Member State
concerned."'7 5
B.

ComparativeLaw
1.

The United States

The United States is, undoubtedly, the country where the trend to
Not
subject professional activity to free competition originated.7 6
74.

Id ati 104.

75.

Id.at 110.

matter, see The Applicability of the Sherman Act to
76. Among the vast bibliography on this
Legal Practiceand Other "Non-Commercial" Activities, 82 YALE L.J. 313 (1972); Thomas D. Morgan,
Where Do We Go From Here with Fee Schedules, 59 A.B.A. J. 1403 (1973); Deborah L. Rhode,
Policingthe ProfessionalMonopoly: A Constitutionaland EmpiricalAnalysis of UnauthorizedPractice
Prohibitions,34 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1981); Philip C. Kissam, Antitrust Law andProfessionalBehavior, 62
TEx. L. REV. 1 (1983); Panel, Antitrust and the Professions: Conflict or Accommodation?, 52
ANTITRUST L.J. 161 (1983); Stephen H. Sachs, Antitrust,the States, and the Professions, 52 ANTITRUST
L.J. 189 (1983); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr.,. et al., Why Lawyers Should be Allowed to Advertise: A
Market Analysis of Legal Services, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1084, 1084 (1983); Dennis R. Bartholomew,
Comment, Antitrust and the Professions: Where Do We Go From Here?, 29 VILL. L. REV. 115 (1984);
John S. Dzienkowski, The Regulation of the American Legal Professionand Its Reform, 68 TEx. L. REV.
451 (1989) (reviewing RICHARD L. ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS (Oxford Univ. Press 1989)); Thomas R.
Andrews, Nonlawyers in the Business of Law: Does the One Who Has the Gold Really Make the
Rules?, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 577, 594-656 (1989); John E. Lopatka, Antitrust and ProfessionalRules: A
Framework for Analysis, 28 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 301 (1991); Gary A. Munneke, Dances with
Nonlawyers: A New Perspective on Law Firm Diversification, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 559 (1992);
Thomas D. Morgan, The Impact of Antitrust Law on the Legal Profession, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 415
(1998); Richard J. Cebula, Historical and Economic Perspectives on Lawyer Advertising and Lawyer
Image, 15 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 315 (1998); Richard J. Cebula, Does Lawyer Advertising Adversely
Influence the Image of Lawyers in the United States? An Alternative Perspective and New Empirical
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withstanding, traditionally the professions found themselves exempt from
the application of regulatory competition rules, contained in the Sherman
Act of 1890. 77 An example of this exemption, the denominated learned
profession exemption, is given by the 1931 Supreme Court Judgment in
Federal Trade Commission v. Raladam Co. 78 In this case, the mentioned
Commission was accusing diverse doctors of committing acts of unfair
competition by misleading advertising, consisting in announcing a weightloss cure as effective and safe. However, the Court rejected the accusation
by expressly declaring that, to the effects of competition rules, professional
practice does not constitute a commercial activity (trade).
However, already at the beginning of the forties decade, the first
symptoms of a change in direction took place. In this manner, in American
Medical Association v. United States, the Supreme Court recognized Competition Law is applicable to the professional services doctors provide.79 In
this case, an Association offered sanitary services to its members in
exchange for a periodic quota payment, reason for which the Association
contracted diverse doctors. Under the argument that this form of providing
sanitary services was weakening the deontological rules of the American
Medical Association, this organization persuaded diverse hospitals to not
admit patients from the previously mentioned Association. In terms of
Competition Law, this practice was incurring clearly in a classic case of a
boycott. Still, the District Court denied the existence of a restrictive act on
competition by understanding that, to the effects of competition rules,
medical practice cannot be qualified as commercial activity. By contrast,
the Supreme Court, though avoiding the direct affirmation that medical
practice constituted a commercial activity, declared that the American
Medical Association's behavior was an act of obstruction and restriction
contrary to the Sherman Act.
In spite of the fact that this Judgment could be extrapolated to all the
professions in general, during a long period of time it dealt, simply, with an

Evidence, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 503 (1998); Stephen Calkins, CaliforniaDentalAssociation: Not a Quick
Look But Not the Full Monty, 67 ANTITRUST L.J. 495 (2000); Marina Lao, Comment, The Rule of
Reason and Horizontal Restraints Involving Professionals, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 499 (2000); Robert
Pitofsky, Self Regulation and Antitrust, Prepared Remarks for the D.C. Bar Association Symposium
(Feb. 18, 1998), at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/pitofsky/self4.htm.
See also the Report from the
AMERICAN ANTITRUST INSTITUTE [AAI], CONVERGING PROFESSIONAL SERVICES: LAWYERS AGAINST

THE
MULTIDISCIPLINARY
TIDE
(Feb.
http://www.antitrustinstitute.orgfbooks/multidisc.cfm.

9,

Between us, see Olavarria & Viciano, supra note 16, at 232-33.

77.
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isolated case, it being necessary that more than thirty years pass to find a
new pronouncement in the same sense. This new pronouncement was the
80
1975 Supreme Court Judgment in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar.
Goldfarb was an attorney, who also worked for the Federal Trade Commission, who wanted to acquire a house, which required contracting an
insurance that, in turn, required the production of an opinion by an attorney.
With this purpose, Goldfarb contacted an attorney, who requested to be paid
the same fees as the local Bar Association had published as minimal fees.
In an attempt to obtain a better price, he contacted a good number of
attorneys, all of which estimated their services in the same amount, without
any of them considering the possibility of providing them for a lower
amount. Some of them even affirmed that they did not know any attorney
who offered a price lower than that fixed. Though the very Association
qualified its fees as mere guidelines, it expressly established that repeated
and intentional breach of the same constituted an infraction of the professsional rules. In light of this situation, Goldfarb sued the Bar Association for
price fixing in opposition to the competition rules.
With respect to the learned profession exemption, the Supreme Court
was clear in affirming that the prohibition to carry out restrictive conducts
contained in the Sherman Act does not contemplate any exception and, in
essence, that independent of the fact that the professional legal activity
possesses other additional characteristics, it becomes evident that it deals
with a service, and that the exchange of such service for money is a "trade"
in the ordinary use of the word.8 l Likewise, it added that:
It is no disparagement of the practice of law as a profession to
acknowledge that it has this business aspect .... In the modem
world it cannot be denied that the activities of attorneys play an
important part in commercial intercourse, and that anticompetitive82activities by attorneys may exert a restraint on commerce.
The rejection of the learned profession exemption has been confirmed
in diverse resolutions following the Goldfarb case. This way, for example,
in 1979, in National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States, 3
the Court qualified as restrictive practice the prohibition contained in the
deontological rules of engineers, of participating in contests in which the
price was part of the initial selection criteria. The sued association based
80.

421 U.S. 773 (1975).

81.

Id. at 787-88.

82.

Id. at 788.

83.

435 U.S. 679 (1978).
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this prohibition alleging that participation in this kind of contests would
reduce the professionals' fees and also lead to reduce the quality of their
services, in prejudice of all of the general interest. However, the Court
declared that this potential risk does not justify the grant of monopolistic
privileges, affirming that although competition does not facilitate the
fulfillment of the deontological professional, it is not a sufficient reason to
prevent competition. On its part, in 1982, in Arizona v. Maricopa County
Medical Society,84 it understood that fixing maximum prices by part of a
group of doctors constitutes an act contrary to free competition.
In 1977, only two years after Goldfarb, the Supreme Court established
in Beats v. State Bar of Arizona that the absolute prohibition of advertising
imposed by a Bar Association on its members, was unconstitutional for
hindering the freedom of expression contemplated in the First Amendment.8 ' The same declaration was reiterated
in 1982 in American Medical
86
Association v. Federal Trade Commission.
Notwithstanding, the courts have not always admitted the application
of competition rules to professionals. In some cases, this denial comes
motivated because an act restrictive on competition has not really been
committed. As, for example, in Hester v. Martindale-Hubbell, Inc.,87 an
attorney's lawsuit was rejected where his request to appear in the
prestigious attorneys' directory of Martindale-Hubbell Law Directory had
been refused for not reaching the required standards. In this case, the court
understood that the determination of admission criteria was adopted in a
unilateral way, which prevented the existence of a restrictive act in the form
of a boycott.
Nevertheless, the most important reason that justifies the inapplicability of the antitrust rules to professionals is, without a doubt, the denominated state action exemption, 8 by virtue of which the competition
restrictions carried out in the exercise of a public authority are exempt from
the application of the mentioned rules. Such exception originated, in the
forties, in Parker v. Brown,8 9 establishing the Sherman Act neither
expressly prohibits the restrictions carried out by the State, nor permits an
inference that such restrictions were meant to be prohibited. Precisely this
exemption justified that the competition rules be found applicable in the
Goldfarb case, since the legal practice regulation approved by the Virginia

84.

457 U.S. 332 (1982).

85.

433 U.S. 350 (1977).

86.

455 U.S. 676 (1982).

87.

659 F.2d 433 (4th Cir. 1981).

88.

Parker et al. v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351-54 (1943).

89.

Id.
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Supreme Court was not forcing the Bar Association to establish minimal
fees, whereas in the Bates case such rules were not found applicable, since
it was the legal practice regulation promulgated directly by the Arizona
Supreme Court, and not one approved by the corresponding Bar Association, which specifically prohibited advertising by attorneys. This was the
reason why the illicitness of the advertising prohibition of professionals in
the latter case had to be based on the infraction of freedom of expression,
instead of looking for it in the violation of competition regulation.
In fact, the state action exemption has justified the accomplishment of
diverse competition restrictions. Thus, in Hoover v. Ronwin, 90 the establishment of a numerus clausus in the access to legal practice; in Lawline v.
A.B.A., 91 the reservation of activity in favor of attorneys, preventing that a
corporation made up of attorneys and other professionals secure clients to
pass them along to certain attorneys, in exchange for a commission; and,
more recently, in Massachusetts School of Law at Andover, Inc. v.
A.B.A.,92 the American Bar Association's fixing of the accreditation criteria
of Law Schools whose graduates can practice law, by rejecting in this case
to accredit a School that intended to offer a lesser curriculum than that of
recognized Schools.
Definitively, the state action exemption has brought as consequence
that the impact of free competition on professional activities has been
sensibly lower than that to which other economic activities have been
exposed. This circumstance has motivated such exemption to tend to be an
object of criticism, claiming a more restricted interpretation of the same and
an attitude more reflective of the public power at the moment of
recognizing competition restrictions. Also heading in this direction is the
trend to broadly interpret the constitutional freedoms of expression and
association, with the goal to invalidate deontological rules that establish
competition restrictions and are covered by the state action exemption.
2.

The United Kingdom

The United Kingdom is, along with the United States, one of the
countries that has advanced the most in the direction of projecting
competition rules on professional activity. 93 On this subject it is,
90.

466 U.S. 558 (1984).

91.

956 F.2d 1378 (7th Cir. 1992).

92.

107 F.3d 1026 (3d Cir. 1997).

In this respect, see Gordon Borrie, The Professions: Expensive Monopolies or Guardians
93.
of Public Interest?, J. Bus. L. 111, 111-25 (1984); Kenneth Button & Michael Fleming, The Changing
Regulatory Regime Confronting the Professions in Europe, 37 ANTITRUST BULL. 429 (1992);
Ehlermann, supra note 2, at 141.
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undoubtedly, the most liberal Member State of the European Community.
Notwithstanding, traditionally, the professions were not subject to the rules
of Competition Law that prohibited restrictive conducts, although they were
subject to the ones related to monopolies. Thus, the professional rules and
practices were excluded from the area of application of the Restrictive
Trade Practices Act of 1976." 4
At present, however, the two principal laws on competition, the Fair
Trading Act of 197395 and the Competition Act of 1998,96 are fully applicable to the professional sector. In this respect, the professional organizations and individual professionals can be considered undertakings or
associations of undertakings, to the effects of the application of the mentioned legislation. Yet, the Competition Act foresees two categories of
exemptions that are susceptible of application to professional activity.
First, the restrictive conducts carried out in the application of a Law
(schedule 3) are found exempt. Secondly, a procedure is established that
allows certain professions to request an exemption to the State Secretary of
Trade and Industry. Though no profession has yet initiated this procedure,
if anyone did, the grant of the exemption would operate automatically
(schedule 4).
The application of the competition norm to professional activity has
been motivated to a great extent by the policies stemming from the two
bodies that control such norm: the Monopolies and Mergers Commission,
presently named the Competition Commission, and the Office of Fair
Trading (OFT).97 By 1970, the Monopolies and Mergers Commission
emitted a general Report in which it completed an exhaustive analysis of all
kinds of restrictions referring to a great number of professions.98 Precisely
due to the general scope of said Report, it failed to reach an in depth
valuation of the contemplated restrictions' effects on competition, though it
did contain some general directives to evaluate the justification of the same.
Recently, see LAW & ECON. CONSULTANT GROUP, LTD. [LECG LTD.], RESTRICTIONS ON
COMPETITION IN THE PROVISION OF PROFESSIONAL SERVICES. A REPORT FOR THE OFFICE OF FAIR
TRADING (2000).

Between us, see Olavarria & Viciano, supra note 16, at 250-52.
94.
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Among the competition restrictions analyzed by the Commission stood
out the entry barriers consisting in the demand of title documents; the
reservations of activity; the fixing of compulsory or guiding fee scales; the
prohibition of certain business structures, especially in the shape of limited
liability companies; the restrictions referring to the multidisciplinary
professional practice; and the limitations in advertising material. In general,
the Report recognized the harmful impact that the analyzed restrictions
could have, potentially, on competition and the public interest, understanding that in many cases existed alternative mechanisms to obtain the
intended purposes. In this sense, the Commission recommended a causeand-effect analysis of every specific restriction, in order to examine the
existence or not of reasons that justify its imposition.
In another way, the Report was referring to some specific restrictions
in the following terms: it allowed, in principle, the entry barriers consisting
of the demand of title documents; it forcefully condemned the fixing of
compulsory fee scales; it showed itself in favor of liberalizing restrictions
related to the structure of business; it understood that the conflicts of
interest risks raised by multidisciplinary practice did not justify its
prohibition, noting its advantages, which were materialized in terms of
scale economies and of sole offering of services; and, finally, it positioned
itself in favor of liberalizing the restrictions in advertising material.
Throughout the seventies' decade, the Monopolies and Mergers
Commission complemented its general Report through the elaboration of
nine sectional reports, centered on analyzing specific competition restrictions referring to specific professions and, particularly, relative to the
advertising of members of different legal professions (solicitors, barristers
and advocates), and to the book-keepers, veterinarians and stockbrokers, as
well as those referring to the fixing of fees by architects and topographers. 99
In nine of eleven Reports, the Commission concluded the restrictions
produced negative effects on the public interest.

99.
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Afterwards, in 1986, the OFT emitted diverse Reports on competition
restrictions existing in diverse professions, such as the limitations on
advertising of professional services in general and, especially, on the
services related to the construction industry; as well as the limitations
related to business structures and those applicable to the industrial property
agent profession.' 00
In March 2001, the OFT presented a Report titled Competition in
Professions, which in turn includes another Report, elaborated in December, 2000, by a consulting company at the request of the mentioned agency,
and denominated Restrictions on Competition in the Provision of Professional Services.' 0 This last Report analyzes the answers of professional
organizations, of representatives of corporations and consumers, as well as
of independent experts, among'others, to the Consultation Paper distributed
in May 1990 by the OFT. In the above mentioned Reports it was recommended that professional activity be held totally and completely subject to
the competition rules, such as it occurs in other economic activities; and, as
a consequence, its proposes eliminating all the restrictions that are not
justified as being necessary to obtain economic efficiency or the protection
of consumers. In essence, it recommends the elimination of the procedure
of exemption previously mentioned, contained in the Competition Act,
which allows the request to exclude certain professional rules from the area
of application of free competition Law.
In particular, the mentioned Report also carries out an exhaustive
analysis of the principal restrictions on competition in three particularly
relevant sectors: the legal services, those of auditing and those of architecture. In the area of legal services, the reservations of activity in favor of
solicitors or barristers stand out; the limitations relative to the business
structure and, especially, those referring to multidisciplinary practice; as
well as restrictions in the subject of advertising and fees. In the auditing
area, the norm that requires the auditing corporations' partners and directors
to be auditors is denounced, as are limitations on advertising and that which
prohibits receiving commissions for referring clients to professionals.
Finally, in the architecture area, the restrictions related to the collective
fixing of fees were especially stressed.
100. See ADVERTISING BY THE PROFESSIONS - A REVIEW OF THE REMAINING SIGNIFICANT
RESTRICTIONS, 1986 (U.K.); REVIEW OF RESTRICTIONS ON THE PATENT AGENTS' PROFESSION, 1986
(U.K.); RESTRICTIONS ON THE KIND OF ORGANISATION THROUGH WHICH MEMBERS OF PROFESSIONS
MAY OFFER THEIR SERVICES,

1986 (U.K.); THE ADVERTISING AND CHARGING RULES OF THE

PROFESSIONS SERVING THE CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY, 1986 (U.K.).
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2001), available at
101. OFT, COMPETITION IN PROFESSIONS 1, (Mar.
http://www.oft.gov.uk/NR/rdonlyres/BO8439C8-C5F6-4946-8AFF-71C050D34F46/0/oft328.pdf, LECG
LTD., supranote 93, at 24.
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The competition policy developed by the Monopolies and Mergers
Commission and the OFT has provoked a deregulation process whose result
has been the elimination of a considerable part of the existing restrictions
on the professional services market, particularly those consisting in the
collective fixing of prices or the limitation on advertising. All this, in spite
of the fact that the implementation of the proposed recommendations by
such entities in their numerous Reports has found difficulty, to a certain
degree, from the fact that some competition restrictions find support in rules
with legal ranking.
In spite of the above, the mentioned deregulation process has been
manifested as much in state norm of legal and regulatory origin, as well as
in the professional rules approved by the diverse professional organizations.
In the first aspect, it must be pointed out that the British legislator and
government have carried out substantial reforms directed at suppressing the
competition restrictions contemplated in legal or regulatory rules. This
way, for example, in the area of legal professions, it is worth noting the
Courts and Legal Services Act of 1990102 and the Access to Justice Act of
1999,103 by virtue of which a large part of the exclusive reservations of
activities for solicitors and barristers is eliminated, stimulating thus the
competition between these two professions, by creating areas of common
performance; and suppressing existing legal restrictions regarding the
multidisciplinary professional practice. As for the deregulation in the area
of professional rules, it should be mentioned that the Law Society, the
professional organization that regulates the main legal profession, solicitors,
created in 1999 a Working Group called Regulation Review Working Party,
with the assignment of revising the deontological rules contained in the
Guide to the Professional Rules of Solicitors,1°4 in order to consider the
liberalization proposals carried out by the OFT. In this direction, in April,
2002, the OFT published a new Working Document in which it showed the
advances accomplished in the twelve months past since the publication of
the Report on professional competition, stating that significant advancements had been made since some restrictions had been eliminated and
others justified, but at the same time manifesting its concern over the
continuous existence of numerous restrictions lacking justification. In 2004
an independent review proposal carried out for the UK government
recommended a reform of the regulation of the legal profession that would
make it less restrictive and more effective, by allowing new ways of
102.
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delivering legal services to the public. This would allow barristers and
solicitors to enter partnership with lawyers who are members of
professional bodies other than their own, solicitors employed by nonsolicitors to provide services to the public, and clients to obtain litigation
and advocacy services from the same firm. Such practices could be owned
by the professionals involved or by thirdparties, such as banks, motoring
organizations,or supermarkets.
3.

Italy

In Italy, unlike what has occurred in the Anglo-Saxon countries, the
subordination of professional activity to Competition Law is a question that.
just began to appear strongly in the nineties' decade. Nevertheless, in these
last years this question is provoking a wide debate, stemming especially, on
one hand, from a Report elaborated in 1997 by the Italian working group
about control of competition regulation; and, on the other hand, from a Law
Project of reform presented by the Italian Government in 1998.105
Until relatively recent, the most widespread opinion effectuated a clear
distinction between professional and business activity, such that professsionals were neither considered to be business enterprises, nor did they find
themselves subject to the business enterprise statute and, certainly, not to
competition regulation. This opinion found regulative support in articles
2229 through 2238 of the Codice civile (Civil Code), which submit
professionals to a regime distinct from the one applicable to business enterprises, somehow excluding the subordination of the former to the latter's
statute. 16
Nonetheless, the transformation professional practice has experienced
lately shows us that, in a majority of cases, the professionals utilize
organizational forms typically corporations, which has produced a coming

105.
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together between business and professional activity. This situation is
reflected in the new regulatory legislation of economic activity, which does
not differentiate between business and professional activity. All of this has
permitted affirmation of the existence of a trend toward the commercialization of the professions. For this reason, in actuality it tends to be thought
that professional activity is a manifestation of the freedom of enterprise
recognized in article 41 of the Italian Constitution.10 7 In this same
procession, the position that identifies professional activity as business
activity is becoming less of a minority position, be that they qualify it as a
civil enterprise or, even, directly as a commercial enterprise.
A point of inflexion in this evolution was the promulgation of the
1990. 08
Italian Competition Defense Act, number 287/1990, of October 10,
Article 4.1 of this Act establishes that it should be interpreted in light of the
principles of community competition rules, which requires acknowledgement of the broad concept of undertaking coined by the community
jurisprudence and, therefore, also supposes that professional practice must
be considered as a business activity to the mentioned Act's effects. In this
regard, it has been affirmed that the undertaking concept welcomed by the
community jurisprudence is not opposed to the one gathered by the Italian
legislator in article 2082 of the Codice civile, which establishes that
"someone that professionally exercises an economic activity organized with
the purpose to produce or distribute goods or services is a business
enterprise. '' 0 9 It would also, as such, deal with a broad concept, which
would allow the incorporation of professional practice in its core. In any
case, it has been alleged that, even if it were admitted that the Codice civile
encumbers a restricted undertaking concept that excludes professional
activity from its field, it would fit to defend that the legislator constructs
diverse undertaking concepts, according to the concrete purposes it tries to
attain in each case and, as for defense of competition material, it would
have encumbered a broad concept that includes professional practice.
In this context, as it has been advanced, the Italian authority in charge
of controlling the competition rules, the AutoritA garante della concorrenza
e del mercato (AGCM, Guarantee Authority of Competition and the
Market), presented on October 9, 1997, a broad Report on competition in
the professional sector, titled Indagine conoscitiva nel settore degli ordini

107.

COSTITUZIONE [COST.] [Constitution] art. 41 (Italy).

108.

Norme per la Tutela della Concorrenza e del Mercato [Norm for the Guardianship of

Competition and the Market], Legge 10 ottobre 1990 n. 287 [Law No. 287 of Oct. 10, 1990], art. 4.1
(Gazz. Uff. Serie Generale n. 240, Oct. 13, 1990) (Italy).
109.

C.c. art. 2082 (Italy).
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and collegi professionali. 10 In general, this Report proposes to the
legislator to revise in depth the professional activity regulation,
emphasizing that public transcendence of the aforementioned activity does
not justify its exclusion from free competition.
In this Report, the need to liberalize the professional sector is justified
when it is affirmed that, in the current context of globalization of the
economy, the value of professional services imported to Italy is superior to
those exported, circumstance that is explained not for the lack of
professional resources in this country, but for the inflexibility of the Italian
regulation of professions, which halts the development of professional
activity and allows professionals from other countries with more flexible
regulation to enjoy a competitive advantage in the exportation of their
services. The Report illustrates that Italian regulation is particularly
restrictive in comparison to that of other European countries, especially in
regards to fees, advertising and professional corporations.
In the task of restructuring the professional regulation and the duties of
the Professional Associations, the Report identifies the principal restrictions
to competition contained in the above-mentioned regulation, and proposes
criteria for their review. In order to accomplish this task, it carries out an
exhaustive analysis referred to, as much as to the general aspects of
professions as a whole, as to the divisional aspects relative to some of the
most prominent professions, grouped in diverse categories: legal (notaries
and attorneys), economic (mercantile experts and labor advisers), sanitary
(pharmacists and doctors) and technical (engineers, architects and
geologists). The following recommendations stem from said analysis:
1)

2)

The establishment of exclusive activities' reserves and mandatory professional associations must re-dress exceptional
quality, admitting itself only when the activity affects
interests of constitutional relevancy, such as health or
justice;
In relation to the restrictions referred to regarding the entry
into the professions, the entrance exams must be ruled by
the principle of impartiality, the periods of mandatory
practices must be accessible to all the possible candidates
and it is unnecessary to establish a numerus clausus of
people that can gain admittance to the profession;

110. L'AUTORITA GARANTE DELLA CONCORRENZA E DEL MERCATO [AGCM] [THE SECURING
AuTHORITY OF COMPETITION & THE MARKET], INDAGINE CONOSCITIVA [COGNITIVE INVESTIGATION],

Provvedimento n. 5400 (IC15) Settore degli ordini e collegi professionali [Provision No. 5400 (IC15)
Sector of the classifications and professional associations], Oct. 9, 1997 (Bollettino n. 42/1997)
[hereinafter AGCM COGNITIVE INVESTIGATION No. 5400]. This report may be consulted at
http://www.agcm.it, under: Tutela della Concorrenza IIndagini conoscitive IAnno 1997.
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3)

In reference to the restrictions relating to professional
activity practice, it proposes to eliminate the legal authority
of Associations to collectively fix the fees of their members;
limit the object of deontological rules to the proper ethical
aspects, excluding from the same the establishment of
competition restrictions between professionals; reject the
advertising prohibition, realizing it is an excellent source of
information for consumers; and admit the professional
practice in a corporate form and, especially, in capital-based
corporation form, which allow the creation of structures of
greater dimensions.

As consequence of the Report's publication about professional
competition, dated July 3, 1998, the Ministers' Council approved a Legal
Project delegating to the Government the restructuring of intellectual
professions."' The Relazione (Exposition of Motives) that accompany this
Project indicate that its objective is to establish general principles common
to all the professions, principles that subsequently must be adapted to the
particularities of every specific profession. 12 In spite of the fact that it
distinguishes among the professions organized around Professional
Associations (Ordini professionali) and those that are not, it is not indicated
which professions should be constituted in Associations, nor which
activities are exclusivity reserved to a certain profession.' '3 It is convenient
to indicate that the above-mentioned Relazione affirms expressly that the
Project tries to obtain the "elimination of all obstacles to competition
between professionals." '" 4 Due to all this, the Project delegates to the
Government the regulation of professional activity and professional
organizations (article 1) and it establishes the general principles that this
regulation must take into account (article 2), among which must be
emphasized the following ones:
1)

Protection of the public interest, bearing in mind, on one
side, the beginning of pluralism and competition; and, on

111. Progetto di legge n. 5092, Disegno di legge Delega al Govemo per ilRiordino delle
Professioni Intellettuali [Law Project No. 5092, Law Design Delegates to the Government for the
at
available
(Italy),
9,
1998
July
Professions],
Intellectual
of
Reform
http://www.camera.it_dati/legl 3/lavori/stampati/sk5500/frontesp/5092.htm.
112. Progetto di legge n. 5092, Relazione [Law Project No. 5092, Relation], July 9, 1998
http://www.camera.it/_dati/legl 3/lavori/stampati/sk5500/relazion/5092.htm
(Italy),
available at
[hereinafter Relazione].
113. Economia Lavoro [Job Economy], Ordini professionali [ProfessionalAssociations], at
3
http://lavoro.economia.virgilio.it/categorie/?ccat-41 4 (last visited Apr. 6, 2005).
114.

Relazione, supra note 112.
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the other side, the deontological principles referring to the
personal character of professional services, the independence and the responsibility of the professionals;
Freedom of access, prohibiting the establishment of
numerus clausus, except in professions that exercise public
functions, and demanding that the practice periods be
characterized by flexibility and efficiency;
Elimination of fixed and binding fees, with exception of the
obligatory professional presentations;
Legal authority of Professional Associations to elaborate a
deontological code;
Regulation of the professional corporations based on the
limitation of participation of non-professional partners and
the establishment of joint responsibility between the corporation and the professional partners; and
Abolishing the advertising prohibition directed at providing
correct information.

It is interesting to emphasize that in this last rule a distinction is
expressly established between professional and business activity (article
2.e), parting from the idea that the first one possesses some "intrinsic and
prevalent" characteristics that distinguish it from the second one, although it
is not identified what these characteristics are. In this matter, a relative
comparison of these two types of activity is done by community authorities,
affirming that the aforementioned comparison possesses an exceptional
characteristic and comes motivated by specific purposes that do not answer
to a systematic approach of the undertaking concept.
By request of the Department of Justice, on February 5, 1999, the
AGMC issued a Report (Parere) on the Legal Project of the professional
restructuring.' 15 In general, the mentioned branch is critical of the Project
alleging that it fails to take advantage of the opportunity to carry out a true
liberalization of the fundamental aspects of the professional services
market, reason why it proposes a reformulation of the same in order to
adapt it to the principles of competition rules. In concrete terms, among the
aspects that are the object of the criticism, it is worth emphasizing the
following ones:
1)

It is opposed to the distinction between professional and
business activity, recalling the community jurisprudence

115. AGCM, RJORDINO DELLE PROFESSIONI INTELLETTUALI [REFORM OF THE INTELLECTUAL
PROFESSIONS] (Feb. 5, 1999). This report can be consulted at http://www.agcm.it/tema0121.htm, under:
Tutela della Concorrenza I Pareri e segnalazioni- Cronologico 105/02/1999.
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2)

3)

4)

5)

and the reference to the same contained in the Italian
competition legislation;
It considers the Project to be excessively vague when it
justifies the creation of Professional Associations, recalling
also that the establishment of activity reserves and of Professional Associations must possess exceptional character;
As it refers to the requirements of access to a profession, it
criticizes that the Project does not sufficiently limit the
different systems of access. This way, it does not establish
the fundamental criteria that must inform the aptitude tests,
does not limit the duration of the practice period, nor does it
generally prohibit the numerus clausus fixing, after allowing it in case of professions that involve private practice of
public functions;
With regard to professional practice regulation, the AGCM
is opposed to the collective fixing of fees, though they
posses a merely orienting characteristic; it demands limiting
the content of ethical codes to the aspects relative to correct
professional practice, excluding precisely the dispositions
that restrict free competition; it explicitly claims that
advertising must refer to the types, characteristics and prices
of professional services; it proposes to recognize a wide
possibility of associated practices, expressly admitting
multidisciplinary corporations; and,
It objects to the absence in the Project of a reference to the
incompatibilities in professional practice, demanding that
all those not necessary be eliminated and proportional with
regard to the aims they pursue.

Independently of the proposed legislation referred to, it must be said
that the AGCM has emitted diverse Resolutions in which it applies the
Competition Law to professional organizations, as well as to certain
professionals. In this respect, the recent Resolution of January, 2000, must
be emphasized, which sanctioned the revisori contabili (auditors)
professional association and the main auditing associations established in
Italy (Arthur Andersen, KPMG, Price Waterhouse Coopers, Deloitte &
Touch6 and Ernst & Young), for carrying out restrictive conducts consistent
with coordinating their performance in the market by, among other actions,
6
the collective fixing of fees and distribution of professional assignments. "

116. Associazione Nazionale Revisori Contabili [National Association of Auditors], at
http://www.anrev.it/ (last visited Apr. 6, 2005); Arthur Andersen, at http://www.arthurandersen.com/
(last visited Mar. 27, 2005); KPMG, at http://www.kpmg.com/ (last visited Mar. 27, 2005); Price
Waterhouse Coopers, at http://www.pwcglobal.com (last visited Mar. 27, 2005); Deloitte & Touche, at
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Likewise, it is worth highlighting that the AGCM, in exercising its
power to propose to public authorities the approval of reforms in the rules
containing competition restrictions, is proving to be remarkably active in
relation to the professional sector, since it has carried out some proposals in
this sense referring to access restrictions, activity reserve and fee fixation
that affect diverse professions.
Conversely, the most recent Italian jurisprudence is geared in essence
to confirm the evolution marked by the AGCM, in considering, to the
effects of applying competition rules, that professionals are undertakings
and professional organizations are associations of undertakings, without
allowing the fact that such organizations developing public functions
prevent the application of that norm. Regarding this should be mentioned
the Judgment of the Appeals Court of Turin of July 11, 1998, relative to the
collective fixing of attorneys' fees; 1 7 the Judgment of the Appeals Court of
Milan of September 29, 1999, referring to the anticompetitive performance
of the consulenti del lavoro (council of labor advisers) consistent in inciting
their members to boycott a private business enterprise dedicated to creating
labor issues management programs;" I8 and the Judgment of Tar del Lazio of
organization
January 12, 2000, relative to fee fixation by the professional
19
experts).'
(commercial
commerciali
periti
groups
that
Before this situation, diverse professional organizations have begun to
liberalize their deontological rules, eliminating especially the existing
restrictions in the advertising field. This has been done, notably, by the
Councils of Associations of attorneys, doctors, or architects.
4.

Spain

In reference to the evolution of this issue in Spain, it is imperative to
emphasize the position of the Tribunal de Defensa de la Competencia
(TDC, Competition Defense Court) as true promoter and author of the
proposition of antitrust regulation on professional practice.12 0 The prominence of this Court has manifested itself as much in the impulse of the
reform of the Professional Associations Act, as in the adoption of an
(last visited Mar. 27, 2005); Ernst &
http://www.deloitte.com/dtt/home/
http://www.ey.com/global/content.nsf/IntemationaVHome (last visited Mar. 27, 2005).

Young,

at

117. Corte app. di Torino [Appeals court of Turin], sez. I, 11 July 1998, n. 791, Giur. It.,
availableat http://www.foroeuropeo.it/art/tariffeintemet/torinol.htm (Italy).
118.

Corte app. di Milano [Appeals court of Milan], sez. (session), 29 Sept. 1999, Giur. It.,

(Italy).
119. Trib. Di Tar di Lazio [Tar of Lazio Tribunal], sez. prima, 28 Jan. 2000, n. 466, Giur. It.,
availableat http://www.foroeuropeo.it/art/tariffeinternetltarlazio.htm (Italy).
120. Despite its name, the Competition Defense Court is not a judiciary authority, but an
administrative one.
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interpretation favorable to subordinating the professions to free
competition.
In the first aspect, it must be recalled that the origin of the above
mentioned reform is found in the Report this Court issued in 1992 titled
Report on the Freedom of Professional Practice: Proposal to adapt the
regulation on associated professions to the regime of free competition in
force in Spain.1 21 In this Report, after carrying out an exhaustive analysis of
professional activity from the perspective of free competition, the Court
wrote an articulated reform proposal of the Professional Associations Act,
in which it expressly declared the subordination of this activity to
Competition Law and, distinctly, omitted the restrictions to the same related
to fees, advertising, business structure and professional activity outside the
territory of association.
After an intricate pre-legislative process, marked by strong opposition
by professional organizations, Court's proposal was finally introduced by
the Act 7/1997, of
means of the Law-Decree 5/1996, confirmed
22 later by
liberalization of Professional Associations.1
The crux around which this reform revolves constitutes of, undoubtedly, the general principle of submitting professional activity to
Competition Law. Specifically, this general principle is formulated in the
following terms: "[t]he practice of degree professions will be conducted in
a regime of free competition and will be subject to, regarding the offer of
services and fixing of remuneration, the Competition Defense Act and the
Unfair Competition Act."' 23 Nevertheless, the Act itself immediately limits
the scope of this principle by establishing that "[t]he other aspects of
professional practice will continue to be governed by general and specific
legislation on
the proper substantive classifications of each applicable
24
profession."'

1

On this point, it is fundamental to note that the current draft of Act
7/1997 is the result of a process of progressive watering down or diluting of
the liberalizing content the initial proposal formulated by the TDC
possessed, a process manifested through the legislative and pre-legislative

121.
FREEDOM

TDC, INFORME SOBRE EL LIBRE EJERCICIO DE LAS PROFESIONES [REPORT ON THE
OF

PROFESSIONAL

PRACTICE]

http://www.tdcompetencia.es/otrosinformes/otrosinformes.asp

(1992),
[hereinafter

available
PROFESSIONAL

at

PRACTICE

FREEDOM REPORT].
122.

Real Decreto-Ley [R.D.L.] [Royal Law-Decree] 5/1996, of June 7 (B.O.E. 1996, 139)

(Spain), confirmed by the Ley Ordinaria [L.O.] [Ordinary Law] 7/1997, of Apr. 14 (B.O.E. 1997, 90)
(Spain).
123.

Art. 5.1 ofR.D.L. 5/1996 of June 7; art. 5.1 ofL.O. 7/1997 ofApr. 14.

124.

Art. 5.1 ofL.O. 7/1997 of Apr. 14.
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reform procedures and that, to a great extent, is the product of pressures
from professional organizations.
In spite of this, it should be mentioned that, after Act 7/1997, other
liberalizing content reforms have been approved. In this respect, it is worth
emphasizing the package of liberalizing measures approved by the Government on June 23, 2000, in which are incorporated, among other measures,
the potential of single professional association eliminating the territorial
barriers such as economic consideration, the admission of applying discounts to notary tariffs and the explicit declaration of real estate inter25
mediation as a free activity not reserved exclusively to any profession.1
An eloquent example of the trend to project competition regulation on
professional activity is constituted by the new General Statute of the
Spanish Legal Profession that the Government has approved recently by
means of Royal Decree of June 22, 2001, published in the State's Official
Journal, number 164, of July 10.126
The new Statute expressly recognizes that the legal profession is
exercised "in a system of free and fair competition" (article 1) and, consistently with that, eliminates some of the principal competition restrictions
contained in the Statute of 1982, especially on fees (article 44), advertising
(article 25), professional corporations (articles 28 and 29) and single joining
of a professional association (article 17).127
The second manifestation of the TDC's leading role in professional
liberalization resides, as has been advanced, in this body's adoption of a
favorable interpretation of the subordination of professionals to competition
freedom. This interpretation is what has made possible that the Court's
doctrine on the subject experience a tremendous evolution that has come
marked by four stages distinguished by the following features: the first by
the Court's stagnation, the second by adopting a broad interpretation of
legal exemption, the third by accepting a strict interpretation of said
exemption and the fourth by activism favorable to the application of
antitrust rules.

125. R.D.L. 6/2000, of June 23 (B.O.E. 1996, 151) (Spain). See Consejo General de la
Abogacia Espafiola [General Council of Spanish Law], Crdigo Deontoldgico [Deontological Code],
Aprobado por el Pleno del Consejo General de la Abogacia Espafiola de 30 dejunio de 2000 [Approved
by the Plenary session of the General Council of the Spanish Law of June 30, 2000], available at
http://www.cgae.es/textos leg/estatuto/cod-deont.htm; see also Teresa Saintgermain, La Clasificaci6n
Urbanistica del Suelo tras las Medidas LiberalizadorasAdoptadas por el Gobierno Espahol [The
Urbanistic Classification of Grounding after the Liberalizing Measures Adopted by the Spanish
Government], INFORMACION JURIDICA, ECON6MICA Y FISCAL [INJEF] [JURID., ECON. & FISCAL INFO.],

July 21, 2000, availableat http://www.injef.com/revista/urbanismo/c_000721.htm.
126.

R.D. 658/2001, of June 22 (B.O.E. 2001, 164) (Spain).

127.

Id.; Arts. 17, 25, 28, 29, 44 of the R.D. 2090/1982, of July 24 (B.O.E. 1982, 210) (Spain).
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Thus, the first stage, which covered the period when the Act of
repression of restrictive competition practices of 1963 was in force, is
characterized by the scarce number of Resolutions the Court examined on
this subject and the fact that in all of them it rejected the existence
restrictive competition acts.
The second stage, which lasted during the first years the Ley de
Defensa de la Competencia (LDC, Competition Defense Act) of 1989 was
in force, is also characterized by the scarce cases submitted to the TDC, but
is distinguished by the fact that the Court considered the restrictive
by the legal exemption contained in article 2.1 of
conducts to be protected128
cases.
the
all
in
the LDC
The third stage, which would begin from the 1992 publication of the
Report on the Freedom of Professional Practice, involved a drastic change
of direction with regard to the previous stage, because the Court accepted a
strict interpretation of the mentioned exemption, which allowed the
emission of the first Resolutions sanctioning 129the execution of
anticompetitive conducts by Professional Associations.
Finally, the fourth stage, which would when Law-decree 5/1996 and
Act 7/1997 came into force, is characterized by definitively consolidating
the TDC's position and motivating control policy of the anticompetitive
legality of professional association's performances, which has translated
and the frequent
into a high number of Resolutions on the subject
130
Associations.
Professional
on
sanctions
of
imposition
The analysis of more than sixty Resolutions emitted by the TDC
regarding professional practice allows us to make numerous conclusions not
only legal, but also sociological. Here I will limit myself to commenting on
a few of the most outstanding. From a sociological perspective, it is worth
emphasizing the following ones:
First, the Resolutions affect a wide span of professions, which encompasses legal professions (attorneys, barristers, administrative solicitors,
notaries and commercial notaries); technical professions (architects, riggers
and engineers); medical professions (doctors, dentists, stomach specialists,
opticians, qualified nurses and veterinarians); as well as professions related
to the real estate area (real estate agents, administrators and experts).
Second, certain professions exist that have especially suffered harassment from the TDC. Principally, and without a doubt, the architects, who
have been the object of more than twenty Resolutions, relating in most

128. Art. 2.1 of the Ley de Defensa de la Competencia [LDC] [Competition Defense Act]
16/1989, of July 17 (B.O.E. 1989, 170) (Spain).
129.

See PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE FREEDOM REPORT, supranote 121.

130.

R.D.L. 5/1996 of June 7; L.O. 7/1997 of Apr. 14.
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cases to diverse categories of restriction to freedom of fee fixation. In
continuation, in a prominent place, we find the real estate agents, who along
with real estate experts and administrators, have been the object of more
than ten Resolutions relating in most cases to restrictions in terms exclusive
activity reservation. Finally, attorneys must also be mentioned, who have
six Resolutions, relating to diverse restrictions on advertising, performance
outside the territorial area of association and activity reservation matters.
Third, and in relation to the type of restriction, it is worth emphasizing
that the most frequent restrictions have been, with differences, those related,
directly or indirectly, to the freedom of fee fixation. In this matter, approximately thirty-five Resolutions have been detected, more than half of the
total enacted Resolutions. The affected restrictions vary significantly:
collective fixing of fees, conditioning project visas to the satisfaction of
professional associations' fee rules, mandatory collection of fees through
Professional Associations, conditioning project permits or authorizations to
the pre-payment of fees, etc. The remaining Resolutions are uniformly
distributed among different restrictions, which stand out those relative to
activity reservation, advertising, associate practice or to performance
outside the field of association.
IV. CRITICAL REVIEW OF PROFESSIONAL REGULATION

Once analyzed the trend, in the national and international arena,
toward subordination of professional activity to the free competition norm,
in the following pages I develop a critical review proposal of professional
regulation directed at eliminating all those competition restrictions that lack
justification. With this purpose, I examine the economic rationality that
justifies the existence of the mentioned regulation, to later propose a series
of general criteria on which to review the legitimacy of competition restrictions contained in the regulation, in order to deactivate all those restrictions
that do not adequately answer the mentioned general criteria.
This review proposal has as addressees, on one side, the regulators, be
they public powers (state or autonomic), professional associations, in their
function to establish, modify or eliminate generic categories of competition
restrictions; and, on the other side, the authorities that apply the regulations
to the professions, referring specifically to the authorities that control the
competition regulation, in their function to supervise the adequacy of
certain competition restrictions.
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A.

Economic Rationality of ProfessionalRegulation
1.

Market Failuresof ProfessionalServices

Traditionally, the exclusion of professional activity from the application area of competition rules has justified itself through fundamentally
spiritual arguments, based on the intellectual and personal character of the
furnishing of professional services, in the altruistic and disinterested
character of such furnishing, in that the services cannot be estimated, in the
confidential relationship that originates between client and professional or
in the profession's deontological values, among which dignity and honor
stand out.
Nevertheless, the regulation of professional activity, and especially,
the establishment of competition restrictions in the regulation, possesses an
economic justification. 131 The purpose of this regulation is to correct the
risks that market failures be produced that reduce the quality of professional
services. These failures can be grouped in two categories: the existence of
informative asymmetries and the generation of externalities.

131. Regarding this approach exposed here on, inspired in the Legal economic analysis, in
American literature, see George A. Akerlof, The Marketfor "Lemons ": Quality Uncertainty and the
Market Mechanism, 84 Q. J. ECON. 488 (1970); Michael R. Darby & Edi Karni, Free Competition and
the Optimal Amount of Fraud, 16 J. L. & EcON. 67 (1973); Hayne E. Leland, Quacks, Lemons, and
Licensing: A Theory of Minimum Quality Standards, 87 THE J. POL. EcON. 1328 (1979); R. C. 0.
Matthews, The Economics of ProfessionalEthics: Should the Professions be More Like Business?, 101
THE ECON. J. 737 (1991); Richard A. Epstein, The Legal Regulation of Lawyers' Conflicts of Interest,
60 FORDHAM L. REV. 579 (1992); Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Disputing Through Agents:
Cooperation and Conflict Between Lawyers in Litigation, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 509 (1994); Jonathan R.
Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Reflections on ProfessionalResponsibility in a Regulatory State, 63 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1105 (1995); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, An Economic Analysis of
Conflict of Interest Regulation, 82 IowA L. REV. 965 (1997); Donald C. Langevoort & Robert K.
Rasmussen, Skewing the Results: The Role of Lawyers in Transmitting Legal Rules, 5 S. CAL.
INTERDISC. L. J. 375 (1997); Larry E. Ribstein, Ethical Rules, Agency Costs, and Law Firm Structure,
84 VA. L. REV. 1707 (1998).
See also the following Reports on professions and competition in the international arena:
REGULATORY REFORM REPORT, supra note 10; COMPETITION IN PROFESSIONAL SERVICES, supra note

10; LECG LTD., supra note 93; COMPETITION IN PROFESSIONS, supra note 101; AGCM COGNITIVE
INVESTIGATION No. 5400, supra note 110.

Between us, see CANDIDO PAZ-ARES, EL SISTEMA NOTARIAL:

UNA APROXIMACIrN

ECON6MICA [THE NOTARY SYSTEM: AN ECONOMIC APPROXIMATION] 67 et seq. (Colegios Notariales

de Espafia [Notary Colleges of Spain] 1995); CAMPINS VARGAS, supra note 1, at 148-65; Francisco
Marcos, La Lucha Contra las Restricciones a la Libre Competencia en el Mercado de Servicios
Profesionales [The Struggle Against the Restrictions to Competition Freedom in the Professional
Services' Market], GJ, May-June 2002, No. 219, at 22-35, passim.
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Information Asymmetries

The informative asymmetries have their origin in the conflict of
interests that arises in the relationships between the professional and the
client. In the economic theory terminology, these relationships constitute a
typical agency relationship, in which the client (principal) entrusts to the
professional (agent) the management of his interests. In this type of
relationships transaction costs are generated named agency costs, which are
those the principal must incur to avoid the agent's opportunist conduct
acting in self-interest and to the detriment of the principal. In this context,
the relationship between professional and client is characterized by generating some high agency costs as consequence of the informative asymmetries
that arise in this relationship. Certainly, these asymmetries are not exclusive of the professional services sector, but in this sector, they are
manifested in a particularly intense form.
In effect, in the professional relationship the client generally has an
enormous difficulty to assess the quality of the professional services offered
to him, even after having acquired the services. Professional services
consist in the application of certain knowledge to a concrete case making it
very difficult to measure the result, bearing in mind the individuality of the
professional and specificity of the case, which does not allow a standardized
assessment of the results. Said differently, the existing relationship
between the activity developed by the professional and the result obtained
by him often cannot be predetermined. Thus, for example, in spite of
making the best effort, the best doctors cannot cure all the patients, nor can
the best attorneys win all the litigations. In principle, the only way to
calibrate such services would be to submit them to the evaluation of another
professional requesting a second opinion, but it is obvious that this
mechanism would increase enormously the cost of services. For this
reason, professional services tend to be included within the category of the
denominated credence goods.
This informative disparity places the client in a weak and dependent
position with respect to the professional, which may end up provoking
market failures consisting in a reduction of the quality of professional
services. First, the difficulty of the clients to assess the quality of services
drives the selection of the professional, not based on quality, but rather on
price, since the latter turns into the only element simple to value for the
client. This circumstance is a disincentive to professionals to differentiate
themselves from the rest based on quality and leads them to center only on
price as the competitive factor, forcing them to reduce the quality to stay in
the market, which leads to a situation where the average quality of
professional services is reduced, turning into what is called "market for
lemons," that is, a destructive competition situation consisting in a
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reduction of prices that generates a reduction in the quality of services.
Second, the client's inability to measure the quality of services can entice
the professional to provide more services than those truly necessary with
the sole purpose of increasing their income. Finally, everything discussed
above leads consumers to reduce their consumption of professional
services.
b.

Externalities

On the other hand, the second category of market failures that may
arise in the professional services sector are external, that is, the effects that
providing these services can generate over third parties not directly
involved in the relationship between the professional and the client. This
risk is based on the fact that the professional bilateral relationship tends to
be, in reality, more complex and conflicting, because it infringes its effects
on third parties, which can turn it into a multilateral relationship.
These externalities arise specially when providing professional
services not only constitutes a private activity, but also constitutes subsequently of simultaneously a total or partial public activity, or possesses a
great public transcendence.
The first case is of those mentioned above where private practices with
a public function or civil servants and, essentially, notaries and registrars,
were denominated. All those professions narrowly linked to essential
public values such as justice or health, particularly, constitute the second
case attorneys and doctors.
A significant example of this second category of professional activity
is the furnishing of auditing services: the audited company may be tempted
to reduce costs by soliciting from the auditor a service of lower quality,
which may have a negative impact on the company's creditors or investors,
which will lack a trustworthy information source about the company's
economic situation.
2.

Corrective Mechanismsfor the Market Failures
a.

Regulatory Mechanisms

As has been advanced, professional regulation fulfills the function of
avoiding the risks that market failures will take place in the shape of
informative asymmetries or externalities, thus guaranteeing a minimal level
of quality of professional services. Hence, first, the requirement of title
documents guarantees the professional possesses the necessary knowledge
and skills in order to engage in the professional activity. Secondly, the
delegation of control powers to Professional Associations, specifically
regulatory and disciplinary powers, constitutes subsequent mechanisms to
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guarantee the quality of professional services. This way, the Associations
have among their functions, on the one hand, to structure the profession by
establishing access systems to the same and approving deontological codes
of conduct and, on the other hand, sanctioning eventual breaches of the
specific structure rules, sanctions that may inclusively consist of the temporary or definitive expulsion from the market. The power to structure the
professions allows imposing minimal standards of quality on the professsionals in defense of the clients, whereas the disciplinary power allows
sanctioning those who fail to fulfill such standards.
An this point it should be recalled that the adopted regulation model
could be based on a partially alternative formula consisting of the assumption by the proper Administration of the mentioned regulatory and disciplinary powers presently assumed by the Professional Associations. The
Professional Associations' formula, contrary to the Administration's,
presents as advantages greater sensibility of the professionals to the
peculiarities of every specific sector and minor control cost, which is
assumed by the professionals. Nevertheless, the disadvantages of this
formula center on the risk that a protectionist attitude could turn the
protection of general interests into sufficient pretext to allow the defense of
particular interests of professionals.
b.

Non-regulatoryMechanisms

Professional regulation does not constitute the only mechanism with
which to confront the risk of failures that take place in the professional
services market. Therefore, non-regulatory mechanisms must also be considered, among which stand out the acquisition or perpetuation of a good
reputation in the service market, the client's interposition of a civil liability
lawsuit for damages caused by the professional, the professional's
guarantee proffers, the public dispersal of information about the quality of
the professional services via consumer publications of these services and
assignment distributions among diverse professionals in order to confirm
their quality.
Nonetheless, these mechanisms present certain disadvantages that
make them less effective than the regulatory method, disadvantages that are
especially serious in the cases of complex professional services, whose
quality results difficult or impossible to evaluate before their acquisition,
and with regard to consumers who lack information and do not possess
resources to control the quality of services.
This way, first, it is true that the professionals' reputation poses an
enormous incentive to provide quality services, because the consequence
they face otherwise is not limited to the loss of the client they are dealing
with, but the eventual future clients who will cease to be attracted by the
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reputation. Regardless, this mechanism does not effectively guarantee that
the professionals will always provide their services with a quality standard
marked by their reputation, which may cause irreparable harms to the
clients who suffer this circumstance.
Secondly, though the civil liability lawsuit certainly offers compensation to clients who suffer harms because the services provided were of low
quality, this mechanism presents diverse limitations. On the one hand, it
operates a posteriori (subsequent), which in principle only projects its
effects on the supposed points were the harm effectively occurred. And, on
the other hand, it possesses a high cost, which is a disincentive for its use in
cases, certainly numerous, where the generated damages are lower than
such cost. Definitively, lawsuit liability, based on a compensation that
operates a posteriori, results less effective at the time of adequately enticing
professionals to maintain the quality of their services than professional
regulation, based essentially on the use of preventive mechanisms that act a
priori (before).
Thirdly, guarantee proffers by professionals, as well as the disclosure
of information about the quality of the professional services also present
some limitations and, especially, the aforementioned difficulty of valuing
professional services in view that generally they do not constitute services
that are provided in standardized or uniform manner, but rather will depend
on the concrete circumstances of each case. Besides, these mechanisms can
represent an extraordinarily high cost for small-scale professionals.
B.

Review Criteriaof Competition Restrictions
1.

ProLibertate (proliberty) Principle

Professional regulation should come inspired in the pro libertate
principle. As mentioned above, this principle is based on the constitutional regulation of professions and, concretely, on a joint interpretation of the
rules that contemplate professional freedom (article 35 Spanish Constitution, SC), enterprise freedom (article 38 SC), as well as Professional
Associations and qualified professional practice (article 36 SC). 32 The
pro liberate principle is reinforced, further, by the constitutional recog33
nition of freedom as supreme value of the legal system (article 1 SC). 1
The principal consequence of the vitality of the pro libertate principle
in professional activity resides in the fact that freedom, as governing
principle of the mentioned activity, constitutes the general rule and, therefore, should be interpreted broadly; whereas freedom limitations constitute
132.

In this respect, see Olavarria & Viciano, supranote 16, at 208-16.

133.

CONSTITUCION [C.E.] [Constitution] arts. I (Spain).
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exceptions to said general rule and, in consequence, should be subject to a
strict interpretation. Specifically, regarding competition restrictions in professional practice, the pro libertate principle implies that, in general, professional activity must progress in a system of broad and complete competition freedom, and that any restriction to it must be considered as an
exception subject to a strict interpretation.
As constitutional jurisprudence has expressly recognized, the exceptions to the freedom principle contained in the professional regulation and,
especially, the restrictions to competition freedom in professional practice,
are essentially subject to two limits that are analyzed next: a formal limit,
the legislative reserve, and the public interest satisfaction.
Limits on the Exceptions to the Pro Libertate Principle

2.

a.

FormalLimit: LegislativeReserve

As has been mentioned above, the constitutional rules that deal with
the professions expressly demand that their regulation be embodied in
norms that have a legislative status (articles 35, 36 and 38, in connection
with article 53.1 SC). 134 Such as has been recognized by the Spanish
Constitutional Court, this legislative reserve does not exclude the legislator
from referring to regulatory rules, although it prevents that such a reference
make possible "an independent regulation, and not clearly subordinated to
the law."' 135 For this motive, the legal references or qualifications to
limit this authority's practice to a mere "legal
regulatory authority must
136
regulation complement.'
The projection of these ideas on competition restrictions in professsional practice unavoidably leads to the conclusion that these restrictions
must be established, whether in a legal norm, or in a regulatory norm (for
example, professional), which possesses what the constitutional jurisprudence calls "sufficient legal qualification."
In this respect, the fact that the legislator explicitly attributes to the
Professional Associations the function of organizing the profession (article
3 LCP) does not legitimize the establishment of competition restrictions by
these organizations, because it refers to a legal qualification of generic
character, which in some way can be sufficiently understood, by virtue of
the above-mentioned strict interpretation to which the exceptions to the

134.

C.E. arts. 35, 36 & 38, in connection with C.E., art. 53.1 (Spain).

135.

STC, July 24, 1984 (B.O.E., No. 83/1984), sec. H,para. 4 (Spain).

136.

Id.
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freedom principle must be submitted regarding professional regulation. 37
Thus, the Professional Associations must possess a specific legal qualification to be able to legitimately limit competition freedom in professional
practice. By virtue of the strict interpretation mentioned, in case of doubt
whether a specific restriction is protected or not by a sufficient legal
qualification, it must opt to consider such qualification does not exist.
This strict interpretation has been expressly received by the TDC in the
prosecution of restrictions contained in association rules, by negating the
existence of sufficient legal qualification when such restrictions were not
protected by a legal norm. Going farther still, the legislator has recently
taken this interpretation to its maximum severity. In effect, the Ley sobre
Colegios Profesionales (LDC, Act on Professional Associations) 1999
reform has limited the field of restrictive competition conducts exempt from
prohibition solely to those that ensue "from the application of a Law,"
eliminating the clause that allowed restrictive conducts carried out in virtue
of "regulatory dispositions dictated
in application of a Law" (article 2.1
138
LDC) to be consider exempt.
b.

MaterialLimit: Public Interest

As has been established by the constitutional jurisprudence, the
professional regulation, whether it is contained in a legal or a regulatory
norm, must be based on criteria of public interest. Nonetheless, neither the
Constitutional Court, nor the jurisdictional bodies have accurately outlined
the content of this material limit referring generically to the public interest.
In relation to the competition restrictions contained in the professional
regulation, and as the TDC has expressly recognized in its 1992 Report, the
mentioned public interest is essentially manifested in the idea of
guaranteeing the quality of professional services, with the goal to protect
consumers from said services against the risks that the aforementioned
market failures arise. 139 Nevertheless, to determine if a specific competition
restriction is justified or not by the mentioned public interest requires a
complex valuation that could be named quality test and is described in the
following paragraphs.
First, however, it suits to mention that the public interest requirement
flatly excludes professional regulation directed at introducing competition
restrictions with the purpose to protect the professionals private interest
and, particularly, those which consists in limiting competition with the aim
137. Art. 3 of the Ley sobre Colegios Profesionales [LCP] [Act on Professional Associations]
2/1974, of Feb. 13 (Directorship), (B.O.E. 1974, 40) (Spain).
138.

LDC of July 17.

139.

PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE FREEDOM REPORT, supra note 121.
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to grant professionals a monopolizing privilege that allows them to
appropriate benefits derived from the exploitation of this privilege, the so
called monopolistic revenues, thus transferring the consumers' wealth to the
professionals. Despite the fact that Professional Associations are legitimized to defend their members' private interests, this circumstance does not
authorize them to use their normative power to restrict competition to the
benefit of the professionals and to the detriment of the consumers.
V.

CONCLUSIONS

Professional activity subordination to competition regulation today is
an irreversible phenomenon. This phenomenon has caused the strong
regulation to which traditionally the said activity is subjected to being the
object of a liberalization process, aimed at eliminating competition restrictions that lack a justification based on public interest criteria.
Even so, this liberalization process is encountering serious obstacles
because of the radical opposition from some professional associations,
which intend to preserve the competition limitations in professional
practice. In a good part of the cases, these limitations have as the only
justification the safeguard of private interests consisting of conserving
traditional privileges, without there actually existing public interest reasons
that allow justifying their preservation.
International experience demonstrates precisely the enormous evolution this theme has experienced, especially in the last decade, and, at the
same time, the numerous advances that are yet to be achieved. The most
palpable evidence of this situation is constituted by the fact that, even in the
countries most advanced on this theme, in which the liberalization process
has been in effect for more than thirty years, there are still numerous
restrictions on competition freedom that continue to exist and lack any
justification.
In consequence, the tension between the regulatory tradition and the
liberal trend cause this theme to be a complex and polemic issue in which
there is still a long path to cover.
In Spain, the liberalizing trend is very recent. Though, at first, the
regulatory framework favored such trend, it has been implemented gradually, motivated to a great extent by the progressive interpretation accepted
by the majority of the competent jurisdictions, beginning with the
Constitutional Court, and continuing with the courts of civil and litigiousadministrative jurisdiction.
At this point, it is worth emphasizing the importance of the TDC,
which at all time has developed an aggressive policy in favor of professsional activity liberalization. The symbol of this policy is, undoubtedly, the
Report on this subject elaborated in 1992 by the TDC. Immediately after
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this Report, the TDC, on one side, motivated the reform that finally ended
in the promulgation of Act 7/1997, Professional Associations' liberalization; and, conversely, it drastically modified its doctrine, accepting a broad
interpretation that has allowed it to supervise with maximum energy the
fulfillment of the competition rules in the professional arena.
Nevertheless, the liberalization motivated by the TDC possesses
significant limits. On one hand, the ambitious reform proposals formulated
by this Court were accepted by the legislator, but only after submitting them
to a dilution process of its liberalizing contents, at the request of some of
the professional organizations. On the other hand, the TDC's supervision is
exceedingly limited by the legal protection that some of the most significant
competition restrictions still preserve.
In this context, the present study proposes to carry out a critical review
of professional regulation, with the goal of eliminating all those competition
restrictions in the professional sector that are not based on the public
interest. This critical review is structured, essentially, around a general
evaluation criterion denominated quality test. By virtue of this criterion, the
competition restrictions constitute exceptions to the general principle of
competition freedom and, as such, can only be admitted if they possess a
justification, of which necessity and proportionality must be evaluated in
strict terms and argued on the base of a casuistically and empirical analysis.
In particular, the reasons that allow justification of the competition
restrictions consists, fundamentally, of the need to guarantee the quality of
the professional services in benefit of the consumers and society in general,
correcting thus the failures produced in the market for these services caused
by the peculiarities of the same.
This review proposal has as principal addressees the regulators of
professional activity, whether they are public powers or professional
organizations, though especially to the latter, since they have in their hands
the responsibility of exercising their functions in agreement with public
interest criteria. Putting this review in practice would permit implementation of a second generation of reforms that would lead to deactivation of
numerous competition restrictions that today are still in force, in spite of
lacking any justification.
This review proposal is based on an irrefutable discovery: in the
countries in which professional activity regulation has been characterized
by greater flexibility, the growth of this activity has been superior to that of
those countries characterized by greater inflexibility. This circumstance has
turned the countries with flexible regulations into exporters of professional
services and those with rigorous regulations into importers of such services.
The most eloquent example of this discovery is provided by the
enormous success of the Anglo-Saxon attorneys' offices in the international
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market. The greater flexibility of the regulation of professional corporations in the United States and the United Kingdom has favored the creation
of large attorney firms characterized by their extensive competitiveness,
which in turn has been one of the principal factors that explain why these
two countries are the major exporters of legal services. On the other hand,
the greater inflexibility of the regulation in continental European countries
has enormously impeded the creation of large attorney firms and, hence, has
favored the disembarkation of North American and British firms.
Unquestionably, time has demonstrated that the liberalizing policies,
and not the protectionist ones, are the ones that truly favor the competitiveness of the professional sector, allowing with it that this sector grow and
increase the quality of its services, all this in benefit of the consumers, of
the professionals and, therefore, of the society in general.

